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Chapter 1. Introduction
1.1 Aims and Background
This report focuses on COSATU’s organisation in the 21st century in terms of 
organising and service strategies; organisational structures; and leadership, 
management and staff development. In each section, the proposals point to 
key directions for organisational renewal.
The report will be discussed at the Central Committee meeting on November 
19 to 22, 2001. It should be subjected to detailed debate and mandating in 
the run up to the Central Committee.
The Seventh National Congress established the need for this organisational 
review. It noted the “need for a thorough organisational review,” in order to 
avoid a piecemeal and ad hoc approach. It therefore resolved,
“A commission be established:
• to review structures of the Federation at all levels, including the substructures of 
the CEC
• to propose policy changes and where appropriate propose constitutional 
amendments
The commission must report to the Central Committee in 2001, which will refer any 
proposed constitutional amendments to the next Congress.”
In February 2001, the CEC established the Organisational Review 
Commission. At the time, it noted worrying trends in some unions’ ability to 
maintain services to members, and therefore decided to extend the review to 
include all aspects of organisational development. In April, the CEC approved 
terms of reference.
The members of the Commission are listed in Appendix 1. They include
NOBs of COSATU and affiliates, regional office bearers, some COSATU
heads of department, representatives of NALEDI and DITSELA, and an (
expert on organisational review.
In preparing this report, the Commission held several workshops, and the 
extended September CEC discussed the draft in depth. Still, the 
Commission’s work was constrained by the lack of time and resources.
Members have many other responsibilities, including mobilising for the strike 
against privatisation in August. The Commission itself did not have a 
dedicated budget.
This situation led to delays, resulting in the postponement of the Central 
Committee from September to November 2001. Moreover, it meant the 
Commission relied primarily on existing analytical work, including the 
September Commission report, rather than conducting new research.
A major problem was that the Commission was unable to conduct a 
systematic review of organisational issues in affiliates. It can therefore only 
set some broad guidelines. To flesh out the strategic guidelines provided
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here, the Central Committee should establish a larger and better-resourced 
organisational review process. This process must support implementation of 
proposals here as well as, where necessary, developing more detailed 
recommendations for the Eighth National Congress in 2003. It must include 
both a COSATU initiative and affiliate projects. The final chapter includes a 
draft programme of action for this process.
1.2 The Need for Organisational Renewal
The need for organisational review does not arise because of major 
weaknesses in COSATU’s work. Indeed, as the Secretariat Report to the 
Seventh Congress noted, COSATU and its affiliates can point to great 
strength in the past seven years. Key successes include the growth in overall 
membership despite a rapid drop in formal employment nationally, the 
increase in real wages, especially in organised sectors, and massive popular 
support for our campaigns.
Still, the labour movement is operating in a rapidly changing and therefore 
risky environment. That means we must regularly analyse our circumstances 
and the implications for our organisations. Otherwise we risk jumping to 
poorly thought out and inappropriate solutions. Moreover, we may fail to 
recognise threats until we have already been weakened.
This organisational review is centred on the need to improve service to our 
members. Three factors drive this approach. First, with falling formal 
employment, unions must maintain their existing membership and expand 
into new areas. That requires improved service to members. Second, in the 
current period, a few COSATU affiliates have been weakened. In these 
affiliates workers complain heavily about the lack of service. Finally, the 
changing legal and economic environment means that serving members on 
the shop floor has become much more complex.
In this context, COSATU must begin to evaluate systematically the 
September Commission’s arguments about organisational weaknesses facing 
the progressive labour movement. In particular, the September Commission 
made the following valid points:
• The establishment of democracy has forced the unions to engage with a 
tremendous range of issues, many of them more complex than in the past.
• Conditions of struggle have changed: during the 1980s unions were driven by 
mass militancy and creativity from below, whereas now the emphasis has shifted 
to national negotiations with government and employers.
• The unions have grown into very big organisations in which it is more difficult to 
sustain democracy, effectiveness and creativity.
• There are worrying organisational trends -  lack of service, lack of skills, lack of 
discipline, lack of commitment -  that could generate a crisis if not addressed.
For these reasons, the September Commission stresses, in Chapter Nine, 
that we must transform ourselves in order to transform society. Its argument 
for organisational renewal forms an important pillar of our approach. Its 
principles are found in the September Commission’s 12-point programme:
1. COSATU should increase its size substantially, becoming a home for all working 
people.
2. COSATU should build powerful organisations in all workplaces and sectors, able 
to defend workers’ rights, bargaining for better wages and benefits, improve
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working conditions and the quality of working life, struggle for workplace 
democracy and service the needs of workers and shop stewards effectively.
3. COSATU should build the Federation and its affiliates as fighting organisations 
with efficient structures, led by effective, assertive and coherent leadership.
4. COSATU should build dynamic, democratic, vibrant organisation, which 
empowers its members to be active as workers, trade union members, and as 
citizens.
5. COSATU needs to develop the internal practices and goals that ensure our staff 
are skilled and committed, proud and happy to be trade unionists.
6. COSATU and affiliates should become a home for working women, with many 
women leaders and staff, demonstrating in practice its ability to improve the 
working life of women.
7. COSATU should rebuild a powerful working class movement, entailing a strong 
organisational relationship with an ANC that is biased towards the working class, 
as well as alliances with other social movements, NGOs, intellectuals and 
students, etc. COSATU should retain its independence while building alliances.
8. Democracy is tremendous historical victory for the working class. COSATU 
should commit itself to consolidating, deepening and extending democracy in 
South Africa -  in other words, to political transformation or redistribution of power.
9. COSATU is the biggest organisation representing the creators of wealth in South 
Africa. As such it should continue asserting its role in economic development, in 
redistribution of wealth, income, resources, knowledge and skills, and job 
creation.
10. COSATU should continue asserting its goals of broader social justice -  the 
delivery of services to all citizens, the construction of a social welfare system, 
ending the wealth and income gaps produced by apartheid, a living wage for all, 
helping to end crime, corruption and violence, etc.
11. In pursuit of the above goals COSATU needs to develop the resources and 
capacities to engage effectively with the alliance, government, parliament,
NEDLAC, provincial and local government, and with employers at sectoral and 
workplace levels.
12. COSATU should ensure that it is a force to be reckoned with, increasing its 
influence in society and winning strong support from society. It should seek to 
deepen the culture of solidarity in society, as a counter to the culture of self­
enrichment.
This report does not seek to implement the September Commission’s 
proposals uncritically. Still, the September Commission went far in defining 
the nature of changes in our environment as well as key organisational 
responses, and we here build on its analysis.
Box One. What Is our perspective on Organisational Development (OD)?
The September Commission called for the consistent application of OD in our 
work. By OD, we mean the continuous assessment and strengthening of the 
structures and systems of COSATU and its affiliates.
OD involves systematic efforts to recognise shifts in the environment and, 
where necessary, take steps to adapt our organisations. It brings new 
challenges, questions and tasks, which require strong support systems and 
adequate capacity.
A particular problem is that OD started in the private sector. We need to 
reconceptualise it in line with the needs and principles of our movement.
In the union context, OD means a process without final or simple solutions, or 
quick fixes, that takes into account union sensitivities, values, and traditions.
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The process requires political will and commitment, with clear and consistent 
guidance and leadership rooted in labour values. At the same time, it must be 
demystified and understood by all stakeholders in the labour movement, from 
its initial conceptualisation through resolution and implementation. In this 
context, as the final chapter of this report discusses, the OD process must 
include a clear understanding of democratic practices in administration. That 
must apply, as well, to the process of implementing recommendations from 
the OD process.
1.3 Overview of the Report
Central to the approach of this report is the argument that the basic functions 
and principles of COSATU and its affiliates will never alter. But we must 
develop our organisations and strategies to respond to changes in our 
environment. Key developments are:
• Politically, the establishment of democratic government, which has 
transformed the conditions of our members and shopstewards and opened 
the door to much complex engagement on policy issues
• Economically, massive loss of formal jobs and rapidly rising 
unemployment, together with a shift to casual and informal employment
• Organisationally, an expansion in the size and complexity of the 
Federation, coupled with shrinking membership in some affiliates and fast 
growth in others.
These developments pose a variety of risks. They radically change the 
conditions of shopstewards, and pose all of us, including our members, with 
more complex choices. In this context, the increased scope for policy 
engagement may lead to an overemphasis on work around government laws 
and measures. To counter this requires a review and reinforcement of the 
educational and organisational strategies that form the basis of workers’ 
organisation. At the same time, job losses and informalisation threaten all our 
gains. The extraordinary growth in “reserve army of the unemployed” since 
the late 1980s means that workers face greater job insecurity and more - 
difficulty in fighting for decent wages and conditions.
Political and economic realities have had an organisational effect. COSATU 
and some affiliates have greatly increased their policy capacity. We need to 
explore how this affects strategies around services in the workplace, as well 
as the demands on NOBs, union democracy and management systems. At 
the affiliate level, shrinking unions must deal with new resource constraints, 
while others face the challenge of consolidating huge numbers of new 
members.
The main strategic directions arising out of this analysis are:
• We need to strengthen services in the workplace and ensure vigorous and 
continuous recruitment campaigns, focusing on workers in informal and 
non-standard jobs. Key steps to that end include defining a clearer role for 
COSATU and improving the systems and capacity of affiliates.
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• We must respond to rising unemployment both by mobilising support for 
economic and social strategies that can create jobs, and by organising the 
unemployed.
• COSATU structures must be reviewed to ensure greater efficiency and 
flexibility, to strengthen political leadership and to ensure a closer link 
between policy units, education and organisation.
• COSATU and all affiliates need to improve their capacity for financial and 
human-resource management, in the context of appropriate, democratic 
management practices that maintain worker control.
Chapter Two of this report establishes the framework that informs our 
organisational review. To this end, it looks at the changing conditions of our 
members and shopstewards. It then outlines the principles that must guide 
our work in a changing environment and the key functions of the Federation 
and the affiliates. Chapter Three then explores key political and economic 
developments since 1994, and some important implications for the labour 
movement.
Based on this analysis, the remaining chapters look at improving our 
response to the political and economic changes. Critical areas include 
organising and education strategies, responses to unemployment, COSATU’s 
organisational structures, and management systems. The final chapter 
proposes a way forward for the organisational review process.
(
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Chapter 2. The evolution of COSATU and the impact of 
democracy
This section first looks at the ways the transition to democracy has affected 
our organisational base -  leadership, shopstewards and members. In that 
context, it sets the basic principles that will guide our review, highlighting the 
importance of worker control. It then outlines the key functions of the 
Federation and the affiliates, since these shape their organisational needs.
2.1 Democracy and COSATU’s organisational base
Service to members is a package that derives from the strength of the 
organisation and not individuals. There is no way a union can service 
members if it is organisationally and politically weak. Service requires:
> Strong shopfloor organisation capable of disciplining shop stewards and 
leadership. Confident, motivated and politicised members who know their 
constitutional rights and obligations.
> A strong, well-trained and politicised shop steward movement.
> Strong organisations with functioning structures at all levels, with 
management systems that support strong service to members.
> Motivated and trained union officials.
The transition to democracy, while opening a host of new opportunities for 
unions, has also added new pressures in these areas. If we do not bolster our 
organisations, we may find that we cannot maintain political cohesion and 
solidarity. We here look at worker control through the leadership, the changed 
environment for shop stewards and members, and the impact of our rapid 
growth in membership.
COSATU has made great progress toward ensuring that its leadership comes 
from the working class. When COSATU was founded, a number of the 
affiliates’ General Secretaries were drawn from university activists, most of 
whom were white. Today almost every General Secretary is a former shop 
steward or office bearer. Furthermore, where before our Presidents were tied 
to their workplaces, now most worker leaders are shop stewards released to 
their unions on a full-time basis. As a result, they have a far better grasp of 
the complex issues of our time, lead huge negotiations and play a key role in 
our international work. They participate far more in the day-to-day operations 
of our movement.
This progress has not, however, translated into a consolidation of the culture 
of accountability and mandating. Indeed, this culture seems weaker than in 
the 1970s and ‘80s, as pointed out in the 1992 “Back to Basics” paper.
It used to be that any leader who attended the meetings of the Federation 
without a mandate was viewed as a black sheep and a focal point of criticism. 
Most would certainly convene meetings, including general members’ 
meetings, to give a detailed report and allow members to question decisions. 
In contrast, in today’s constitutional meetings, leadership rarely claim to have 
a mandate, and the process of reporting back is relatively uneven.
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In these circumstances, leadership may become used to taking decisions 
without a mandate. Then, when decisions are taken, they are hardly 
explained to the constitutional structures, much less to members. The 
dangers of this happening on a wide scale are very clear. A key aim of the 
organisational review process, then, is to arrest these foreign practices from 
creeping into our movement.
Under apartheid, a shop steward had to be a real leader. Usually she or he 
had been recruited personally by the General Secretary, the organiser or 
other workers after being identified as one of the most influential and 
respected workers at the workplace.
This crop of shop stewards provided our leadership. They were not in it for 
money or an easy life. Leaders in any part of the democratic movement 
invited victimisation, including dismissal, harassment byjhe employer, and 
loss of promotion opportunities. Beyond that, they faced the unwelcome and 
brutal attentions of the apartheid security forces.
Shop stewards, like other leaders, always had duties beyond the workplace. 
They helped with the broader mobilisation and with the leadership of the civic 
movement and political formations. To be a shop steward meant you couldn’t 
save money, because every cent was consumed by endless trips to 
meetings, the office and for general organisational and political work. Above 
this, shop stewards had to report back difficult decisions, obtain mandates 
and discharge them, leading to many general meeting and committee work in 
the union.
This was a hard school. Workers have a reputation of being frank, and 
sometimes downright rude. Being shouted at and insulted empowered this 
layer of leadership, which learnt to be more tolerant and keep a cool head in 
the face of provocation. Discipline was enforced brutally. Distinct features 
included respect of the elders and tolerance of the different traditions and 
cultures of workers who make up our membership. Lobbying to be elected for 
any position meant that you would kiss your chances of being elected 
goodbye. It is precisely this training that makes former worker leaders 
sometime seem to stand head and shoulders above the rest.
Since the establishment of democracy, the labour movement faces new 
challenges, which affect our shop stewards deeply. Above all, being a shop 
steward is no longer a sacrifice for the struggle, and may bring material 
benefits. As a result, some shop stewards today were elected not only 
because they are respected but because they lobbied intensively, or even 
used patronage. In these circumstances, to maintain the shop steward 
movement, we need to define their role much more clearly.
A particular problem is that management has become more sophisticated. 
Management is no longer hostile; it appears friendly and can understand and 
speak the shop steward language. In fact, the manager may be a former 
union official, even a former shop steward. Before, where managers would 
harass and dismiss shop stewards; now they give them benefits and try to 
recruit them into management positions.
In addition, the work of shop stewards has changed. Before, being a shop 
steward invited death and imprisonment. Today, in some cases, it may mean
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never getting into a factory to wear overalls, gumboots and safety gear. A full 
time shop steward may spend the whole day in an air conditioned office 
drinking tea and cold drinks provided by management.
Finally, with the collapse of apartheid, a range of service organisations have 
begun to compete for the attention of the shop stewards and leaders to sell 
their products. These services include funeral schemes, medical aids and 
saving schemes, but also mashonisa -  the loan sharks. Suddenly shop 
stewards find themselves seiving more like tender boards without rules. Gifts 
and favours may be exchanged under the table.
This does not mean that most of our leaders or shop stewards have become 
corrupt or careerist. On the contrary, most have remained with the ideals we 
developed over decades of struggle. The ones who only wanted a better life 
for themselves have left. But there is no doubt that our workplace leadership 
now faces a host of new pressures and choices, and that their roles have 
changed. We need to use this organisational review process to define how 
we can reposition the shop steward movement to lead COSATU into the new 
millennium.
Similar shifts have affected all our members. In the past, workers joined 
unions mainly because of the intertwined relationship between their 
exploitation and oppression at the workplace and their struggle for liberation. 
They needed a shield at the workplace to stop humiliation, exploitation and 
abuse. They joined in droves when the unions presented themselves as such 
a weapon. At the same time, they knew that there was no way to eliminate 
workplace abuse without resolving the national question.
Workers’ unity and sense of common purpose was maximum. They expected 
no reward for wanting to defeat humiliation at the workplace, where they lived 
and in the society as a whole. Indeed, they knew they would have to make 
great sacrifices. They were angry and militant. They knew that their course 
was just and there was no space for confusion. They knew we had to 
maintain solidarity amongst all the oppressed. There was only one enemy 
and that was the ruling elite -  the apartheid government and the bosses.
Seven years after the liberation, these factors are now starting to disappear, 
not only in COSATU, but in all the organisations of the liberation movement. 
There is no more a single uniting enemy or a common understanding of the 
way forward, and the culture of solidarity is waning. Some regard the 1994 
breakthrough as their final destination. Membership and leadership positions 
in the ANC, the Party and other components of the liberation movement have 
become a route to plum jobs and power.
The culture of selflessness, willingness to serve without demanding a 
personal gain, and in general the culture of activism that won our liberation 
are at risk from new values, cultures and traditions that are foreign to the 
movement. Careerism, individualism, corruption and distribution of patronage 
have taken root. Those in powerful positions can surround themselves with 
an army of praise singers. Solidarity has been replaced by a new culture of 
the “survival of the fittest,” intolerance of different views, and the ostentatious 
display of personal power and wealth.
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COSATU’s political foundation was influenced by the solid political and 
ideological work of the ANC/SACP underground as well as former UDF 
affiliated unions, much of FOSATU and other independent unions that formed 
COSATU.
This work resulted in the deepening culture of debates. This In the main was 
because of the nature of a trade union movement as a broad church that 
accommodates all left wing tendencies. Although the repeated congresses 
placed COSATU firmly in the camp of the Congress movement led by the 
ANC, the contestation did not simply end.
The huge advantage of this contestation was the demand that it placed on all 
those involved. Unions competed to show that, they could provide better 
service than their rivals. Political education was intense. Unions spent huge 
resources on ideological training for both leadership and members. Political 
workshops were held all over. Every shop steward and official knew how to 
drive to Wilgespruit and similar centres that were willing to host union 
meetings.
A good number of COSATU unions have not given up this culture. It is 
worrying, however, that some have. In fact, one or two unions did not budget 
a single cent for education at all, not even for shop steward training. This is a 
very dangerous development and must be halted immediately.
Finally, the rapid growth in membership poses particular problems for our 
organisations, and especially for worker control. At the embryonic stage, 
unions were small and easy to manage, effective and provided five-star 
service to members. There was a very dynamic link between the structures 
and leadership, and it was easy to understand each other’s thinking. 
Mandating processes were relatively simple, because not too many 
workplaces or even numbers were involved. Communications were not a 
nightmare. As a result, service to members could be maintained relatively 
easily.
Today the biggest COSATU affiliate has 300 000 workers and organises in 
three different sectors -  mining, energy and construction Four COSATU 
unions have over 200*000 members, and six more have over 100 000. 
Moreover, all the founding unions have gone through mergers and integration 
processes. Our unions are now truly national, demanding more resources to 
convene meetings and more complex systems for mandating and reporting 
back.
All these issues combine to affect the quality of service and the type of 
movement we are. The best examples of the past and present translate to 
qualitative service to members. After all, we are not insurance company, 
where a customer must get satisfaction when they have a problem and come 
to the managers desk or the toll-free help line. If we cannot maintain our 
political vision, commitment and solidarity, we will never be able to serve our 
members and maintain the strength of the organised working class.
2.2 Basic principles and vision
To understand the challenges we face, we need to spell our basic principles, 
which are rooted in our history.
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COSATU can trace its origins back to the many attempts - some successful, 
some not - to organise black workers in their own unions, starting at the turn 
of the century. The first black union was formed in 1917. For the next four 
decades, Communist and later ANC activists worked hard to establish strong 
unions. Their success was seen among others in the 1946 African miners’ 
strike.
In the 1950s and ‘60s, the momentum of the democratic and progressive 
labour movement faced a huge setback with the repression and exile of the 
ANC and the Party. Toward the end of the 1960s, however, progressive white 
university students began to help reorganise democratic trade unions. Their 
work received a huge boost during the Durban strikes. Many COSATU 
affiliates trace their history to this period of history.
The formation of FOSATU in 1979 gave impetus to the struggle to organise 
workers into democratic unions. FOSATU had many good traditions and 
values that remain a cornerstone of our principles today.
Worker control stood at the heart of FOSATU’s values. It was an expression 
of a particular style of organisational development as well as a political 
statement. It meant uncompromising insistence on internal democracy, report 
backs and mandating, in a context of robust debate and full accountability. As 
a political statement, it embodied the ideal of worker control of the means of 
production and the dictatorship of the proletariat. *•
Box Two: Worker Control
Worker control means that ordinary members ultimately determine the basic 
strategies and decisions of the unions. It is important because:
• The union’s power is the power of workers, and will survive only if workers 
control the union.
• Workers must control their unions so that they can protect themselves from 
officials and leaders abusing or misleading the organisation.
• Under apartheid, if workers controlled their union actively from their 
workplaces, the state could never destroy it. In contrast, with very 
centralised control, when the state banned union officials and leaders, the 
union sometimes disintegrated.
• Worker control is an element of our socialist philosophy of organisation and 
society. We believe that ultimately the state itself should be controlled by 
the working class and its allies and the means of production should be 
owned by the working class.
Worker control means more than having workers in leadership. It means that 
strategic decisions must be mandated by membership, and that leaders must 
report back consistently. By extension, members must have the chance to 
understand and study the issues. That takes time, and may seem inefficient 
and slow. Especially for complex policy issues, it requires appropriate 
engagement tactics, educational work and communications.
Formally, worker control of the Federation takes three routes: through the 
elected NOBs, constitutional meetings of affiliates, and the election of 
regional office bearers. At the same time, we must find ways to educate
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shopstewards and members so as to build organic intellectuals -  that is, 
intellectuals who are integrally part of the labour movement.
Worker control is a central organisational principle for the labour movement, 
but it is not simple to implement. Above all, it requires that unions put the time 
and resources into educational work, mandating procedures and democratic 
processes. Where we have engaged with government or business on policy 
issues, these can cause substantial delays. As we discuss in Chapter 3, the 
transition to democracy has increased these challenges by expanding the 
range of policy issues confronting the labour movement._________________
In terms of the broader political scene, we have not achieved worker control.
The Alliance always says loosely that the working class is a motive force of 
the NDR, but we have not translated this principle unambiguously into 
political decisionmaking. Still, the struggle for socialism is ongoing, and 
definitely not an event that we can just wait to celebrate.
Ultimately, all our work must shift the balance of class forces in favour of the 
working class. Key steps include restructuring the economy to develop new 
centres of power and ownership to counter big business; fostering an 
effective, developmental public sector that can meet our people’s basic 
needs; combating the selfish, rapacious worldview of capitalism; and 
strengthening democracy and openness throughout society.
This vision shapes our organisational principles:
• Transformative unionism: Workers’ struggles cannot be confined to the 
workplace. Under apartheid, COSATU helped lead the struggle against 
racial oppression throughout society, as well as at work. Today, it plays an 
active role in shaping policy and legislation in favour of the working class.
In this context, the unions must provide an elementary political school for 
workers.
• Worker control: Workers must control unions and the Federation. That 
requires internal democracy, clear mandating structures, and accountable 
leadership. A key element is a strong shop stewards movement, combined ----- 
with strong shop-floor organisation and a commitment to robust internal
debate, as discussed in Box Two. 1
• Worker unity and solidarity: Workers have only their unity to set against 
the power of employers and the state machinery. For this reason,
COSATU has always called for one union in each industry as well as a 
single Federation for the country. We seek to build solidarity both across 
sectors and with workers in other countries, and especially in southern 
Africa.
• Non-racism and non-sexism: Racism and sexism are two of the main 
causes of division in organised labour. COSATU has always insisted that 
workers from all racial groups must unite in the union movement. It 
demands, too, that women play an equal role in organised labour-  
although in the event, men remain dominant in leadership.
• Militancy: Ultimately, workers’ power comes only from their united action.
What we cannot win on the shopfloor and in the streets, we will not win in
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the boardroom. COSATU has always used the power of its members to 
achieve its aims both in the workplace and in the broader sphere.
• Selflessness: Most COSATU leaders, staff and members joined the 
organisation to advance the workers’ cause, without regard to personal 
gain. Up to today, COSATU leaders and officials typically earn less than 
they could in the private sector.
• International solidarity. Especially with globalisation, no national union 
movement can survive by itself.
• Paid-up membership. The union movement can only survive because 
every member makes the necessary contribution. This is one of the basic 
principles of solidarity.
• Political independence from the employers and the State. The Tripartite 
Alliance entrenches the independence of the three partners, so that each 
can carry out the mandates of its constituency.
To achieve the broad objectives of transformative strategic unionism require 
strong organisation. We must have the capacity to represent workers on the 
shopfloor as well as on complex policy issues. Even more important, we must 
establish systems and structures that ensure members can and do take an 
active interest in union affairs. In short, we need to improve our capacity for 
mass engagement as well as for policy engagement. In sum, we need to 
transform ourselves to transform society.
2.3 The functions of the Federation and affiliates
In order to assess our work, we have to define our basic functions. The 
Federation’s role is to build unity, to co-ordinate affiliates’ activities, and to 
create an environment that is favourable to the affiliates’ sectoral struggles. 
Out of these three key tasks flow COSATU’s functions:
• To ensure a unified voice for progressive labour, and ensure mutual 
protection and support between sectors. •
• To develop policy positions for the entire working ciass, going beyond the 
sectoral needs of individual affiliates, and engage on them, including 
through national campaigns. Examples include economic policy, labour 
law and welfare policies.
• To deal with demarcation issues.
• To provide strategic support for affiliates by supplying materials and 
helping them share experiences in dealing with common problems.
• To give targeted assistance to weaker sectors, such as farm and domestic 
workers.
The affiliates’ functions are:
• To ensure workers in the sector speak with a single voice, and provide 
support for workers in more vulnerable areas within the industry.
• To assist workers with grievances in the workplace.
• To negotiate wages and other conditions of service.
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• To develop policies for their sectors, working with the Federation and 
affiliates in related sectors where necessary.
• To co-ordinate workplace organisation to avoid conflicts and ensure 
greater efficiency, including leading campaigns around sectoral issues, for 
instance on restructuring or AIDS.
• To ensure the implementation within the sector of gains won by the 
Federation on a policy level, such as the new labour or pension laws.
These different functions must guide organisational development. Changes in 
our structures and operations must all work to improve the Federation’s 
services to affiliates, and affiliates’ service to members, while strengthening 
worker control at all levels.
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Chapter 3. Changes Since 1994
The period since 1994 was a period of dramatic political, social, economic 
and organisational change. It was a period of intense adjustment and learning 
for the union movement. It is important to analyse what has changed and how 
it has affected us. This section first examines political and economic 
developments, and then explores some of the implications for COSATU.
3.1 Political and social changes
The political and social changes since 1994 include, above all, the creation of 
a democratic system itself. We won liberation and established the dignity of 
black and working people. In the process, we won relative peace throughout 
our country and the region, ending the low-level warfare that had ripped us 
apart for decades. We also gained elements of state power, with a new 
Constitution that enshrines the rights of all our people, especially workers, 
women and youth.
The shift in political power has brought important gains for our members. We 
won a transformation of the labour laws, which now extend to virtually all 
workers, support organisation and centralised bargaining, set decent basic 
conditions, and establish a framework for skills development and health and 
safety. The government has gone far to improve basic services for poor 
communities. Within the state itself, democracy has been entrenched through 
the Open Democracy Act, the National Protector and the establishment of 
representative local government.
But these gains do not mean that everything has been easy. COSATU 
entered the political transition with the assumption that we would be able to 
co-determine socio-economic policy and workplace restructuring. We 
believed that we were equal partners and competent to engage. This belief 
rested on further assumptions about the Alliance: that it would remain 
homogenous and in full control over government.
In the event, power continues to be contested both in government and the 
Alliance. We did not anticipate the power of global and local capital to exert 
pressure on the democratic government, which led to the GEAR’S austerity 
programmes. This contestation has led to highly contradictory policies, where 
progressive initiatives are generally thwarted by rightwing economic and fiscal 
policies. We discuss these contradictions in greater detail in the next section.
Overall, the basic free-market thrust in economic policy has meant that there 
is little fundamental change in the economy and class structure. As a result, 
the past order continues to exert a powerful influence on our new democracy. 
Apartheid created and protected a massively unequal distribution of 
resources. These inequalities continue to define our society. Hence the need 
for transformation -  a process of struggle to redistribute power, wealth and 
income as well as education, knowledge and skills.
These contradictory policy developments have placed great pressure on 
COSATU to expand its engagement in policy debates. Government has 
introduced changes in the labour laws, social development, local government,
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tariffs, gender, AIDS, and a host of other areas. COSATU is asked to take 
positions on all of these.
The establishment of new forums has also increased the pressure to engage.
The transition to democracy brought a range of new policy forums, including 
NEDLAC, Parliament, local government, departmental consultations, and 
meetings on parastatals under the NFA. At sectoral level, the establishment 
of central bargaining and SETAs and the agreement to hold sector summits 
have facilitated a greater emphasis on industrial policy questions.
Yet the increased scope for policy engagement does not mean that labour 
can assume success in debates. In particular, since the late 1990s, 
government’s proposals -  especially around the economy -  have often been 
unacceptable to workers. This has added to the pressure on COSATU to 
engage.
Recently, when these engagements have ended up in conflict with
government, we have seen serious efforts to split COSATU, both by dividing
affiliates from the Federation NOBs, and by sowing divisions between
affiliates -  within the public service, and between the public-sector and (
industrial unions.
The organisational impact of heightened engagement depends in part on the 
type of policy under debate. If we take the core of union organisation as the 
workplace, then different policy areas pose qualitatively different challenges 
for labour. We can define three categories:
• Policies that are directly relevant to workplace bargaining issues. These 
include labour law, occupational health and safety, skills development and 
pensions.
• Policies that are less directly linked to normal union concerns, but impact 
directly on workers and our overall strength. The main issues here are 
industrial strategy, privatisation and workplace restructuring. •
• Finally, there are a range of policy issues around social development and 
fiscal and monetary policy. These may seem quite remote from the world 
of work, yet they have a strong impact on our members and the economy.
The problem is that their links to normal union concerns are not always 
obvious.
In short, some policy issues are further from traditional union concerns than 
others. That means that, however important, they may be less easy for shop 
stewards and members to understand and harder to link to workplace 
organisation.
The increased pressure to engage in policy debates poses three strategic 
challenges for labour.
First, in national policy debates, how do we decide when to use power and 
when to rely on other forms of engagement? As in any labour negotiations, 
we must engage on a range of questions where we will not use power.
Ultimately, however, only our ability to use power on key issues gives us 
influence. This situation means we need to reflect on how we manage policy 
discussions where we will not use power.
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In this context, we need to decide how far to go in confronting government on 
policy issues. Internationally, most unions in democratic countries are less 
able or willing to use power around national policy debates. They rely instead 
on in-depth policy engagement and on their electoral power.
Second, how do we ensure adequate resourcing and support for the 
implementation of our policies on the shop floor? There are two risks here.
• The majority of our members, and even office bearers, may not 
understand the complex policy issues that officials and a few shop 
stewards deal with at NEDLAC. This situation can make a mockery of 
worker control. It is most common where the issue seems far from 
workplace concerns. An example is monetary policy. It also occurs where 
government has established complex structures and processes, as with 
skills development.
• We may end up devoting so much time and resources to national and 
sectoral issues that we neglect workplace problems. This situation has 
occurred with the failure to ensure implementation of national policy 
victories in the workplace. Examples include pensions, health and safety, 
labour relations and skills development.
Third, we often have to respond urgently to policy initiatives. For instance, the 
Parliamentary schedule sets tight constraints on our inputs on legislation.
This can undermine democratic mandating processes.
3.2 Economic Changes
Even as the political landscape shifts, changes in the economy have led to 
huge job losses as well as modifications in workplaces. The achievement of 
political democracy brought a reconnection with the global economy, 
substantial restructuring of the state, and changes in government support for 
business. Gold mining has continued to face employment problems. 
Meanwhile, management in the public and private sector shifted to a strategy 
of outsourcing, casualisation and decentralisation.
Government responded to these challenges with contradictory strategies, 
marked by a clear shift to the right with the adoption of the GEAR in 1996.
The most important trends are:
1. A commitment to improving social protection for historically deprived black 
communities. Social protection refers to government services designed to 
address poverty, including education, health, welfare, housing and 
municipal infrastructure.
2. The fundamental reform in labour laws, discussed above.
3. With the adoption of GEAR in 1996, the government set restrictive targets 
for fiscal policy. These targets had the effect of cutting government 
spending between 1996 and 1999 by 9 per cent in real terms. Since 1999, 
the budget has grown slightly.
4. Policies that effectively extend the reach of the market through 
privatisation, tariffs and deregulation. These policies are generally not 
articulated as part of a pure laisser-faire philosophy. Instead, they are 
developed as sectoral measures. The philosophical commitment to free
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markets emerges primarily in the government’s often stated belief that 
“competition” will almost automatically bring about more efficiency. Most 
government economic policies now argue that regulated markets should 
replace government ownership. (See for instance, the DPE and DTI recent 
policy documents.) This free-market philosophy has gone hand in hand 
with an export push, which links most government support to export 
efforts.
These strategies have not stopped job losses. Indeed, the restrictive fiscal 
policy and the free-market approach aggravated them. According to Statistics 
South Africa, since 1990 employment in the formal sector outside of 
agriculture has shrunk by over a million. We lost one in five formal jobs 
between 1990 and 2000, and one in ten just between 1997 and 2000.
The job losses combined with rapid growth in the labour force. As a result, 
again according to Statistics South Africa, the unemployment rate soared 
from 16 per cent in 1994 to over 25 per cent in 2000, using the narrow 
definition that does not count workers too discouraged to look actively for a 
job. Using the expanded definition, which includes discouraged jobseekers, 
the unemployment rate is 36 per cent. Young people joining the labour 
market are worst off. Using the expanded definition, some 46 per cent of 
those aged 18 to 35 are unemployed, compared to 24 per cent for people 
over 35.
Virtually every sector has experienced downsizing, with the biggest job losses 
in gold mining, construction and, especially after 1997, in manufacturing and 
the public sector. Agriculture also sustained very large job losses. Within 
manufacturing, metal and machinery production outside auto suffered the 
biggest losses, with employment contracting by a third. Clothing and food 
production also suffered greatly.
Job losses are compounded by the growth of the informal sector, casual and 
temporary work. Management has seen outsourcing and casual or temporary 
employment as a way to undermine workers’ gains. Managers in both the 
public and private sector have sought to divide production between smaller. _ . 
units, outsourcing where possible, and shifting to casual and temporary 
workers. These strategies break up bargaining units and limit workers’ legal (
rights, especially to job security.
Part-time work has increased steadily. The figures only go back to 1998, but 
just in the past three years the number of part-time workers and their share in 
the labour force has almost doubled, from 4,4 per cent to 8,4 per cent of 
formal workers. The retail sector has seen the largest growth in this sector, 
increasing from 91 000 to 162 000, or from 21 per cent to over 30 per cent of 
the workforce. In clothing and textiles, part-time workers now constitute 6 per 
cent of the formal workforce, up from 0,5 per cent in 1998; in construction, 
they have risen from 5 per cent to 10 per cent.
Official statistics suggest that only the informal sector has seen substantial 
employment creation in the past few years. These activities are worse paid, 
less secure and more dangerous than formal work. According to Statistics 
South Africa, 20 per cent of informal workers report no earnings at all, while
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over 40 per cent more earn under R500 a month. (Statistics South Africa 
2001 xx)
Informal employment has expanded in large part because massive job losses 
in the formal sector have left many workers with no option but survivalist 
activities such as hawking and parking cars, both of which are officially 
considered forms of employment.
The shift to informal, part-time and casual work represents both a reaction to 
increased foreign competition and a counterattack on our gains since 
democracy. It aims to make organisation and negotiation much more difficult. 
It effectively deepens the divide between formal employees in relatively well- 
paid, skilled and secure jobs, and a growing army of poorly paid, less skilled, 
temporary workers. In effect, this process reinstates the apartheid labour 
market, with unskilled workers in particular losing labour’s gains since 1994 in 
terms of job security and better pay. Unless we can find an effective strategy 
to organise workers in part-time and casual work, they can be used to break 
up the strength of our unions. The current difficulties facing SACCAWU, with 
almost a third of retail workers now part-time, points to the need for urgent 
action.
The loss of formal employment, particularly in manufacturing and mining, 
means that COSATU’s traditional base is under threat. As discussed below, 
this has huge organisational implications. Above all, unions in mining and 
manufacturing will continue to lose members unless we can find ways to 
recruit informal and casual workers and expand employment.
3.3 Organisational responses
Since 1994, largely in response to the economic and political changes 
described in earlier sections, the organisational structure and strategies of the 
progressive labour movement have changed in significant ways. The impact 
on shopstewards and members was outlined in the previous chapter. This 
section looks at key changes, including:
• The change in the structure of membership, with a decline in 
manufacturing, mining and the parastatals, and rapid growth in the public 
service. This has been accompanied by greater participation by 
professionals, especially teachers.
• The legal right to organise and negotiate in various new sectors.
• The successful merger of many unions, combined with the recent 
admission of unions that do not fit in the concept of “one union -  one 
industry.” •
• The growth in the staff of the Federation, at least, with an increase in 
positions dedicated to policy and negotiations. This has been associated 
with a focus on national and sectoral policy, without sufficient reflection on 
how to ensure implementation in the workplace.
• The establishment of union investment companies.
We here look at the level of organisation in the country, and then assess each 
of these developments in turn.
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3.3.1 The level of organisation
South Africa has one of the highest rates of union density -  the percentage of 
workers that belong to unions - in the world. Union density, as a proportion of 
all the employed outside domestic work and agriculture, increased from 18 
per cent in 1985 to 40 per cent in 2001. In the same period, membership 
doubled, from 1,4 million to 2,7 million, even though formal employment 
declined.
In terms of the federations, COSATU remains the largest. Both FEDUSA and 
NACTU have about 500 000 members, but FEDUSA has grown relatively 
while NACTU has declined. A number of independent unions, including the 
recently launched Federation of Independent Unions, account for about a 
million members. Both COSATU and NACTU represent mostly black, lower- 
level workers, while FEDUSA represents largely professionals and semi­
professionals.
The following table is based on a government survey. It indicates both the 
strength of unions overall, and the big variations between industries. Mining is 
the most organised sector, with 77 per cent union density. In most of the rest 
of the formal sector, union density runs between 20 and 50 per cent. In 
agriculture and domestic labour, however, union density remains very low.
Union membership and density by sector
Numbers of Union
Sector members (000s) density1
Mining and quarrying 379 000 77%
Community, social and personal services 1 062 000 61%
Electricity, gas and water supply 42 000 47%
Manufacturing 516 000 40%
Transport, storage and communication 155 000 35%
Finance, insurance, real estate and business services 195 000 25%
Wholesale and retail trade 263 000 21%
Construction 65 000 14%
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 64 000 8%
Domestic labour 18 000 2%
Total 2 769 000 33%
Total except agriculture and domestic work 2 687 000 41%
Notes: 1. Union membership as a percentage of total employment. *under 10 000. Source: 
Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey, February 2001, Table 3.12.4
Overall, union membership is more or less representative of the labour force 
in terms of gender and race. In other words, it reflects the discriminatory 
patterns in employment. Still, Africans and men are over-represented 
compared to whites and women, as the following table demonstrates.
Total employment and union membership by gender and race







Source: 1996 Census for employment figures.
As the following table shows, the most heavily organised sectors typically 
have higher wages and involve larger enterprises. This reflects on the one
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hand the fact that big enterprises provide better opportunities for organising, 
and on the other the gains won by organised workers.
Union density, earnings and size of employer by sector______________
COSATU membership % earning over % of employers with 
Sector________________ as % of employment R1000/month over 50 employees
Agriculture 2% 7% 8%
Construction 9% 54% 28%
transport, communication, 
retail, private services 12% 58% 24%
Manufacturing 40% 69% 52%
Public service and local 50% 81 %1government
Mining2 65% 81% 69%
Notes: 1. Includes private personal, community and social services. 2. Estimated without
CAWU.
Sources: For COSATU membership as % of employment, Statistics South Africa and reports 
to Seventh National Congress; other data from Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey, 
February 2001.
Although union density does not vary much by province, union membership is 
concentrated in the four largest provinces - Gauteng, KwaZulu Natal, the 
Eastern Cape and the Western Cape.
In sum, in very broad terms, the “average union member” is an African man, 
in his 30s, living in Gauteng and working as a miner, a teacher, or in a 
factory. By contrast, the “average non-unionised worker” is a woman in her 
20s, living in the Northern Province, working as a secretary, domestic or farm 
worker.
3.3.2 The changing structure of membership
The economic changes since 1994 have seen a huge change in the sectoral 
structure of COSATU’s membership. After 1997, in particular, manufacturing 
and mining unions faced large membership losses, which could undercut 
established structures and union power. The loss of members resulted above 
all from job cuts and a shift to new types of employment. Meanwhile, the 
public-service unions continued to expand rapidly, meaning they had to 
consolidate new members. • - - -
The following table depicts changes in COSATU’s membership by sector. It 
shows
1. After 1997, due to losses in mining and manufacturing, COSATU grew 
much slower than in previous years. Membership rose only 1 per cent a 
year in 1997-2000, compared to 5 per cent a year between 1991 and 
1997.
2. Following very rapid growth in membership, the public service and local 
government now form the largest single sector. They have displaced 
manufacturing and mining, which have shrunk in size. Appendix 3 gives 
the changes in membership by individual affiliates.
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Membership by Sector, 1991-2000
Membership % of total
Affiliate 1991 1994 1997 2000 1991 2000
Public service and local government 78 000 224 000 484 000 670 000 6% 38%
Manufacturing 677 000 519 000 604 000 513 000 54% 29%
Transport, communication, retail, 
private services
204 000 224 000 304 000 310 000 16% 17%
Mining 300 000 311  ood 311 000 252 0001 21% 14%1
Construction 30 000 25 000 31 000 38 0002 2% 2%2
Agriculture n.a. n.a. 29 000 22 000 n.a. 1%
Total except agriculture 1 259 000 1 303 000 1 763 000 1 805 000 100% 100%
Note: 1. Estimated without former CAWU members in 2000. 2. Estimated former CAWU 
members in 2000. Source: Union reports on membership for Seventh National Congress
The following table compares changes in membership to employment by 
sector. If unions have maintained the share of membership in total 
employment, it seems likely that their loss in members mostly reflected job 
losses. In contrast, if membership fell as a percentage of employment, then 
we have to look to additional explanations, including changes in the nature of 
employment as well as service to members.
The table shows that the loss in membership in mining and manufacturing 
was greatest in 1997-2000 -  the period of fastest job losses. Nonetheless, in 
mining, COSATU’s membership continued to rise as a share of total 
employment. In other words, the downsizing mostly reflected shrinking 
employment on the gold mines. In manufacturing, after rapid growth in 1994 
to 1997, membership dropped as a share of employment. In contrast, 
membership and union density continued to grow in government and, overall, 
in transport, communication, retail and private services. But membership fell 
in the parastatals, where job cuts were huge, with the increase mostly in 
retail.
Changes in membership and density of membership by sector
% change in 
membership
COSATU membership as % of 
employment in sector
Sector 1994-1997 1997-2000 1994 1997 2000
Agriculture n.a. -24% n.a. n.a. 2%
mining 2% - 19% ’ 52% 59% 65%’
Manufacturing 16% -15% 36% 44% 40%
Transport, communication, retail, private 
services
35% 2% 8% 11% 12%
Construction 1% 20%1 7% 10% 17%2
public service and local government 117% 38% 15% 33% 50%
total except agriculture 33% 3% 26% 37% 41%
Note: 1. Estimated without former CAWU members in 2000. 2. Estimated former CAWU 
members in 2000. Source: Statistics South Africa, STEE (final quarter each year) for 
employment, union reports to Seventh National Congress for membership.
The fall in union density in manufacturing largely reflects the shift to non­
standard forms of employment through outsourcing, piecework done at home, 
and informalisation. This trend was most pronounced in clothing production, 
where a shift to sweatshops occurred. An additional factor may have been 
employers’ efforts to move out of the metropolitan areas to less well 
organised towns where wages and benefits are lower. The following table 
gives trends in manufacturing by subsector.
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Changes in membership and density within manufacturing
membership in 2000
% change in 
membership





% of COSATU 
membership in 
manufacturing 1994-1997 1997-2000 1994 1997 2000
Metal work (NUMSA) 200 000 39% 30% -9% 35% 49% 49%
Clothing (SACTWU) 
Food processing
120 000 23% 0% -20% 65% 61% 55%
(FAWU)
Chemical
119 000 23% 15% -15% 53% 69% 65%
(CEPPWAWU) 74 000 14% 21% -22% 18% 23% 18%
Source: Statistics South Africa, STEE (final quarter each year) for employment, union reports 
to Seventh National Congress for membership.
The effects of changes in employment on union membership emerge from the 
following table. It shows that workers outside of unions are much less likely to 
be permanent, and much more likely to be temporary or casual employees.
Union members and other workers according to work status
Union employees Non-union employees
Permanent 98% 66%




Source: Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey 2000
These membership trends have major implications for COSATU as well as for 
individual affiliates. Above all, given falling formal employment, if COSATU 
affiliates do not increase union density we will start to see declining 
membership in the Federation as a whole. That has implications for financial 
and organisational stability as well as for the power of the working class.
In many sectors, affiliates can increase their membership only by finding 
ways to organise historically difficult sectors, such as home-based and casual 
workers. In the long run, labour can remain strong only if the economy begins 
to create jobs instead of destroying them.
The unions faced with massive declines in membership generally must also 
deal with falling real incomes and, as a result, problems in maintaining 
staffing. Unless dealt with strategically, this can translate into declining 
services for members and further membership losses. Moreover, resource 
constraints have sometimes fuelled conflict within union leadership.
Unions in the public service have expanded very rapidly. This brings a variety 
of new challenges. •
• COSATU must integrate big professional groups, especially teachers and 
nurses. Teachers alone now account for over 10 per cent of all COSATU 
members. Professionals bring a high level of skills to the labour 
movement, but typically have fairly weak traditions of militancy and 
sacrifice. A particular problem is that some of the public-service unions are 
still defined in terms of professional status, not sector, which can lead to 
an exclusive mentality and violates the principle of one industry -  one 
union.
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• The public-service unions have had to develop financial and 
organisational structures very quickly, which may lead to inconsistencies 
and inefficiency.
• About 400 000 public servants are designated as part of the essential 
services, which include virtually all of police and health care. As long as 
these services do not sign minimum-service agreements, these workers 
are not allowed protected strikes. Instead, they must rely on compulsory 
arbitration to deal with disputes. In other words, about one in ten COSATU 
members is still not allowed to strike. This about obviously undermines the 
power of labour as a whole.
• With the shift to a democratic government led by the ANC, public-sector 
unions face difficult choices. Government has shifted to a policy of strict 
wage restraint -  for workers, not political leaders -  and attempted 
downsizing. In some cases, especially before the nature of these policies 
became clear, union officials and shopstewards felt they had to co-operate 
with government.
3.3.3 Managing labour rights
The Constitution and the 1995 Labour Relations Act (LRA) brought radical 
changes in unions’ activities. Key innovations related to the scope of union 
organisation, the structure of negotiations and dispute settlement.
For the first time, public servants, farm and domestic workers received the 
right to organise. As discussed above, especially after the introduction of an 
agency fee in the public service, this led to an explosion in membership. 
Success has been far less substantial for farm and domestic workers, who 
face very difficult conditions even with a legal right to organise. Still, without 
doubt, the new organising rights proved a huge benefits to the union 
movement, partially offsetting the negative economic situation.
The LRA also established new bargaining institutions, especially the 
bargaining council. This system was supposed to replace the fragmented and 
often discriminatory industrial councils with genuine sectoral bargaining. 
Success in instituting the new system has, however, varied greatly by sector. 
This situation points to the need to revive the COSATU campaign in support 
of centralised bargaining.
The greatest victories have been won in the public service and local 
government. Before 1993, there were no negotiations at all in the public 
service. In local government, provincial councils effectively ignored black 
workers. Only the separate metro councils were reasonably inclusive. Today, 
there is centralised bargaining in both the public service and local 
government. This has led to substantial improvements in pay, benefits and 
job security, especially for lower-level workers. In itself, it has become an 
incentive for workers to join the COSATU affiliates, which play a leading role 
in the national councils.
In contrast, progress has been much less rapid in the private sector. In 
mining, and retail, unions have failed to establish sectoral councils. They 
basically seem comfortable maintaining informal national negotiations with 
national companies or employer associations, without setting up formal
Page 26 of 72
DRAFT 5
councils. This has two negative effects. First, it means that the dispute 
settlement systems may remain unclear, or rely heavily on the CCMA.
Second, agreements become vulnerable because workers in the industry are 
effectively divided. Even if a national company reneges on an agreement -  as 
happened during the Shoprite-Checkers merger -  there is no clear 
mechanism to mobilise support across the entire sector.
In manufacturing, little has been done to organise new bargaining councils. 
Low levels of membership in some industries mean that it would, in any case, 
be difficult to register councils.
Where centralised bargaining has emerged, it has significant organisational 
implications. It requires clear-cut mandating systems, as negotiations get 
further from the workplace. Moreover, it generally demands stronger national 
bargaining teams, who can look at developmental issues for the sector as 
well as bread-and-butter demands. These requirements can contribute to top- 
heavy structures. Yet centralised bargaining also brings major benefits, above 
all increased solidarity and power, the ability to protect vulnerable workers, 
and more efficient bargaining systems that require less union resources.
Finally, the LRA established new dispute-settlement procedures centred on 
the Commission for Conciliation, Mediation and Arbitration (CCMA) and the 
Labour Court. These systems were supposed to bring more rapid, equitable 
and efficient justice to the workplace.
In Chapter 3, we analyse the challenges unions face in using the CCMA. We 
do not have enough information on the impact of the new dispute-settlement 
systems on affiliates’ resourcing and service strategies.
Certainly the shift to more procedural, legalistic solutions has increased the 
need to ensure legal training for shop stewards and officials. Grievances and 
disputes that used to be resolved through power, if at all, must now go 
through the CCMA’s simplified legal procedures.
The new system was also supposed to strengthen dispute-settlement by 
bargaining councils. If the CCMA accredits a council to conduct dispute 
settlement, members no longer need to go to the CCMA. Bargaining council 
systems promise substantial benefits: greater insight into sectoral 
requirements, more control by the major parties in the sector, and new 
employment opportunities in providing conciliation and mediation services. In 
effect, they would bring more resources into the dispute-settlement system, 
which would also reduce the burden on the CCMA.
Unfortunately, the lack of bargaining councils in most sectors means that 
dispute settlement relies on the CCMA. Moreover, some weak councils have 
indicated that they want to outsource the management of dispute settlement, 
which could undercut some of the hoped-for benefits.
In sum, the new legal framework brought new challenges for union 
organisation. On the one hand, it opened new sectors for organisation and 
strengthened the prospects of sectoral bargaining. On the other, by 
expanding the right to dispute settlement and centralised negotiations, it 
raised the risks of an overly centralised and technical approach to labour 
relations.




Demarcation is a central role for the Federation. COSATU has always 
believed in the principle of “one industry -  one union.” Despite some 
successes, however, developments have not always conformed to this 
guideline.
In recent years there have been some successful mergers that have 
increased the viability of the unions involved. The formation of CEPPWAWU 
and SATAWU and the integration of CAWU into NUM are the main examples.
But other factors work against the consolidation of sectoral unionism. First, 
we have admitted a number of small unions in the public service and 
entertainment fields. The aim is to bring more workers to the Federation. The 
effect, however, is to include unions that are too small to protect their 
members. Some also organise in sectors where larger unions are already 
operating. Thus, DENOSA, SADNU and SASAWU all have virtually the same 
scope as NEHAWU.
In addition, some public-service unions are still defined according to their 
profession, not the sector. SADNU and DENOSA, for instance, focus on 
nurses, and SADTU only admits teachers. The problems can be seen by 
looking at the education sector. There are 360 000 educators in the public 
service, about two thirds of whom belong to SADTU. But there are also 
around 100 000 other workers in the education sector, who have been almost 
entirely neglected in restructuring initiatives. There is a problem, too, that the 
maintenance of “professional” unions can undermine worker solidarity. For 
instance, some nurses objected to the development of career paths for 
unskilled workers to join the nursing profession. They argued that as 
professionals, nurses should never be grouped with cleaners.
COSATU accepted the a number of unions tactically, with the aim of working 
toward worker unity. We assumed that once they were in COSATU they
Box Three. Are workers growing less militant?
Strike statistics have declined significantly since 1994, from an average of 
four million hours on strike in 1991-’94 to an average of 1,5 million hours in 
1995-2000.
Does this indicate a loss of militancy? The evidence is that it reflects, instead, 
the changes in the labour laws that make the strike weapon less appropriate 
and necessary. Most strikes before 1994 were around dismissal, 
retrenchment and other shopfloor grievances, which can now go to the other 
forms of dispute settlement. Today, most strikes are over wages. Even there, 
the CCMA has often played an active conciliation role, reducing the duration 
of strike action.
Other possible causes are less positive. The risk of job losses may stop some 
workers from striking. The extent of essential services in the public service is 
a further blockage. Furthermore, the public service does not have a tradition 
of extended strikes.
As discussed below, a particular problem lies in the failure to establish strike 
funds in the Federation or in affiliates. This makes it hard for workers to 
undertake strike action for more than a few days^_______________________
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would merge with larger unions in their industry. But we have lacked a clear- 
cut plan to achieve this objective. The newly affiliated unions seem to remain 
unchanged indefinitely, even though they have joined COSATU. This has to 
change to avoid the emergence of a “passenger syndrome.”
Finally, demarcation decisions by the Federation have been ignored in some 
cases, causing considerable conflict and disunity in confronting employers. In 
particular, demarcation disputes have persisted for years between FAWU and 
SACCAWU, SACTWU and SACCAWU, NUM and NUMSA, CEPPWAWU 
and SATAWU.
3.3.5 Changing organisational structures
The opening of the political space and the creation of institutions have 
produced uneven engagement strategies, which are reflected in 
organisational structures. Both COSATU and its affiliates have engaged 
strongly on national and sectoral policy, often without working out 
implementation at the shop floor. This risks creating a gap between the few 
shop stewards, negotiators and officials who understand the complex policies 
under negotiation, while disempowering other workers and even NOBs who 
feel left behind. Organisationally, it appears in
• over-resourcing of the head office relative to other layers of the 
organisation,
• the absence of consistent strategies for implementing policies in the 
workplace, and
• the lack of a clear link between policy engagement, organisational and 
educational work.
We do not have sufficient information on the development of affiliates’ 
organisational structures. We will therefore focus here on the changes in the 
Federation.
The following list gives the changes in COSATU departments since it was 
founded in 1985. It shows the tendency to shift focus to policy development 
and engagement. .....' ■
1985: administration, organisation, education, publicity
1995: administration, organisation, education, publicity, negotiations, 
Parliamentary Office, information technology -  and NALEDI
2001: administration (plus a new Secretariat co-ordinator), organisation,
education, media, Parliamentary Office, information technology, policy 
unit -  and NALEDI
As this list indicates, COSATU’s internal staffing has grown significantly in the 
past seven years. But virtually all the growth has been in the policy units -  the 
Parliamentary Office, the Policy Unit and NALEDI. In contrast, COSATU’s 
growth has largely by-passed education and organising. We need to assess 
whether similar imbalances have emerged in the affiliates.
This shift in organisational structure has two important implications.
• The changes were necessary to respond to the pressure to engage on a 
broad range of policies, which is discussed above. From the standpoint of
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a union federation, however, the new developments did not establish a 
coherent system. Above all, the relative neglect of organising and 
education meant that COSATU largely lacked structures and strategies to 
ensure workplace implementation of policies. The Policy Unit was 
supposed to address this problem.
• Oversight of the organisation has become much more difficult and 
complex. This places huge burdens on the Secretariat, and makes 
oversight by the NOBs more difficult. The addition of a co-ordinator in the 
Secretariat has not proven enough to ameliorate the problem. The 
increased complexity of the organisation has also meant more complex 
budgeting and human-resource tasks. Yet administration systems remain 
little changed, with the General Secretary still personally responsible for 
much of the work instead of focusing on key policy and management 
decisions.
3.3.6 Union investment companies
The establishment of union-sponsored investment companies has generated 
controversy within and outside union movement. The following table lists the 
main companies.
Union Investment Companies
COSATU Kopano ke Maatla
CEPPWAWU CEPPWAWU Investments,
SACCAWU SACCAWU Investment Holdings
NEHAWU NEHAWU Investment Company
SADTU SADTU Investment Holdings
NUMSA NUMSA Investment Company
NUM Mineworkers Investment Company
CWU Communication Workers Investment Holdings
POPCRU POPCRU Investment Holdings
SATAWU SARHWU Investment Company
SACTWU SACTWU Investment Group
Critics suggest that the companies mean that unions now want, not to smash 
capitalism, but to manage it in the interest of their members. This view over­
simplifies a complex situation. Union investment companies were established 
to ensure union’s gain financial sustainability, to change patters of ownership 
and investment in the economy, and to provide some benefits for members. 
We need to assess them against this yardstick.
Experience has produced a mixed picture, and we need a systematic study of 
the issue. On the one hand, some of the companies do indeed try to fulfil their 
original mission. On the other, some have become a law unto themselves, 
seeking profit at any cost. This has had spill over effects into the union, 
leading to leadership squabbles and double agendas. For instance, even as 
the Federation opposes privatisation, rumours abound of investment 
companies trying to leverage a share in the deals.
Box Four. When union investment companies work
The SACTWU Investment Group (SIG) and NUM’s Mineworkers Investment 
Company are often viewed as models of how the investment companies can 
benefit unions and their members.
Page 30 of 72
DRAFT 5
Formed in 1993, the SIG has established many projects for SACTWU
members. These include:
• R20 million in bursaries for members and their children between 1996 and 
1999
• A learning programme for pre-school and primary school learners, and a 
children’s centre
• Computer literacy training for shop stewards.
• Winter Schools to upgrade matric pass rates
• With the University of Natal, a workers’ college to provide training in areas 
like labour studies, labour economics, women and development, and 
political studies
• A programme to combat the spread of FilV/AIDS.
The Mineworkers Investment Company established the Mineworkers
Investment Trust, which in turn develops projects to support NUM members,
ex-members, their families and their communities. Its projects include:
• The Mineworkers Development Agency supports various income­
generating activities for union members and their families, and especially 
retrenched miners, mostly in rural areas and mining towns.
• The Elijah Barayi Memorial Training Centre provides training in leadership 
and management for NUM members, with courses in political education, 
computers, management and labour.
• The J.B. Marks Bursary Fund offers assistance for members and their 
dependants who would like to pursue professional studies in areas such 
as engineering, industrial psychology, geology, etc.
Page 31 of 72
DRAFT 5
Chapter 4. Organising in the New Millennium
To ensure worker control, deal with the changes in the economy and the 
labour force, and translate policy victories into concrete benefits for members 
in the workplace, COSATU and its affiliates need to review their strategies on 
organisation and education. The last section looks at how we have evolved in 
response to political and economic changes.
This section discusses strategies for improving service on the shop floor, 
recruitment, demarcation, and union education. It clarifies the different roles 
of the Federation and affiliates in establishing a more coherent approach to 
organising. Finally, it looks at strategies to respond to the unemployment 
crisis.
4.1 Assessing workplace service
The ability of unions to retain current members and recruit new ones
ultimately depends on the ability to respond to members’ needs. Poor service
can lead to dual membership, lessened interest in union activities and (
ultimately loss of members. Since we need to expand membership into new
areas to counter the effects of job losses, ensuring quality service must be at
the heart of a successful organising strategy.
Good service for members involves consistent systems for reporting back and 
mandating; effective representation of members in both individual and 
collective disputes; efforts to meet women’s special needs; and education 
work to ensure members can make informed judgment about union positions.
We also need to decide how to locate policy work, which improves the socio­
economic conditions of all workers, within our concept of service for 
members.
We need systematic research to determine the nature and extent of problems
with union service to members. Here, we first propose a framework for
analysis, and then review the rather sketchy evidence on current practices in
terms of wages, dispute settlement, education, women and socio-economic
work. ^
4.1.1 Conceptualising Service in the Union Context
Currently, two main definitions of union service delivery have emerged. An 
economistic approach emphasises material benefits to members. The more 
transformative view sees service for members as centred on building our 
organisations to advance worker control and improve workers’ condition of 
work and life.
COSATU has historically adopted the second definition. We need to ask 
whether the victory over apartheid should change our emphasis.
The economistic approach centres on “bread-and-butter” issues. It reduces 
union membership to a form of exchange, where workers get service in 
exchange for their dues. In this view, workers stay in unions mostly because it 
improves their material circumstances -  wages, benefits, working conditions, 
protection against unfair labour practices and job losses. They may even join 
for additional services like funeral schemes, bursaries and car insurance.
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This approach ultimately sees our members as customers, who pay for union 
services. It risks ignoring the unions’ political and economic role -  that is, the 
fight for a better society and more equitable relations in the workplace. Even 
in the U.S., the home of “service-first,” economistic unionism, the model is 
being questioned. For example, after 90 years of operating on the ‘service- 
first’ model of unionism, the New York State’s Civil Service Employees 
Association has begun a movement to focus members’ energy on union 
building, solidarity, and organising. Otherwise, members may see the union 
only as an insurance policy against future trouble. (Civil Service Employee 
Association 2001)
COSATU has always adopted the transformative view of service to members. 
This approach does not mean that material victories, for instance around 
wages and benefits, have no place. But it places equal emphasis on building 
strong union structures, worker participation and union democracy, political 
education and training, and worker solidarity. The development of a 
disciplined, accountable and committed union cadre is critical for this 
approach to union service.
Our experience is that workers do not join COSATU just for the material 
benefits. Historically, they chose COSATU because they want to be in the 
forefront of the struggle to change power and social relations in their 
workplace and their communities. They want to build workers’ solidarity and 
mutual support.
This does not mean we can neglect protection for workers in the workplace. 
That is always the baseline of union activity. But we do not want to end up 
competing with unions from other federations primarily over additional 
services like funeral benefits.
A NALEDI study of workers’ expectations suggest that members want their 
unions:
• To ensure job security, represent workers at the workplace and stop
intimidation by employers. Workers gave these three issues almost equal 
priority. .
• To improve communication at work, by improving relations between 
workers, with management and between races at work.
• To improve working conditions, health and safety, and education and 
training. •
• To provide or pressure companies to provide specific benefits, such as 
housing loans, scholarships and low-cost transport.
More broadly, we can understand workers’ service needs in terms of five 
dimensions.
Solidarity: To have organisational forms that let workers support each other 
consistently.
Representation To have a stronger voice on the shop floor, for grievances 
and disputes and to protect job security and dignity, as well as in broader 
political and economic debates.
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Working conditions, ranging from pay and benefits to safety and job 
security.
Living conditions: Unions and the Federation must work generally for social 
policies that will benefit poor communities.
Participation in decision-making: To be involved in the decision-making 
within the union and the broader society. That means members need 
accurate and timely information as well as political education.
We now briefly review some indicators of union service to members — 
remuneration, representation, union education, women empowerment, and 
policy work. Section 2 of this chapter then proposes a strategy for 
strengthening the organisational work of the Federation and affiliates.
4.1.2 Wages and benefits
Virtually every study shows that unionised workers have significantly better 
pay and benefits than unorganised workers. In the first few years of 
democracy, unions generally made huge gains, especially for lower-graded 
African workers. Now, however, it appears that both public and private 
employers are resisting further transformation of pay and benefits.
As the table on page 15 indicates, sectors with higher levels of union 
organisation have far fewer workers earning under R1000 a month. This 
reflects the success of unions in raising wages for lower-graded workers. 
Thus, in sectors with union density under 15 per cent, less than 60 per cent of 
workers earn over R1000 a month. The worst situation in terms of both 
organisation and wages is found in agriculture and domestic labour. In 
contrast, highly organised sectors like mining, the public service and local 
government have done much better, although they also rely heavily on less 
skilled labour. In these sectors, more than 80 per cent of workers earn over 
R1000 a month.
Still, as the following table shows, after initial successes, most industries in 
the private sector saw a decline in the minimum wage in the late 1990s.




Percentage change in real terms1 
1995-1997 1997-1999
CAWU 1262 1% -19%
T&GWU 1203 2% -18%
CEPPWAWU 1513 -9% -11%
NUMSA 1866 10% -9%
SACTWU 1385 -2% -4%
NUM 1372 20% 0%
SACCAWU 1574 0% 1%
FAWU 2211 1% 22%
SAMWU 1788 18% 24%
Average1 1612 8% 0%
Note: 1. Deflated using CPI as of June. 2. Weighted by membership. Source: Award
The public service also won very large increases in the minimum salary after 
1994, reaching over R2000 a month by 2000. From around 1999, however, 
the State as employer began explicitly to resist efforts to close the wage gap.
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Overall wage increases in real terms also show a similar pattern of slower 
gains in the later ‘90s. Except in 1996, the average increase in the public 
service has been about half as high as in the private sector.
Wage settlements in real terms, 1996-2000
Year
Annual settlement 
levels Inflation rate in June
Average real 
increase
1996 13.4% 6.9% 6.5%
1997 12.5% 8.8% 3.7%
1998 9.3% 5.2% 4.1%
1999 9.4% 7.2% 2.2%
2000 7.0% 5.2% 1.8%
Source: LRS, Actual Wage Rate Database. These averages are not weighted by 
membership, so they provide only a rough guide to real increases enjoyed by workers.
We need a more in-depth study to explain the slowdown in pay increases 
after 1996. Contributing factors include:
• Increased employer resistance. This was also shown by the prolonged 
auto strike in 2001 and the repeated disputes in the public service after 
1999. In part, employer intransigence reflected the pressure to become 
“competitive.” In part, business began to feel less pressure to overcome 
the apartheid legacy.
• Rising unemployment, which increases the pressure on workers to settle 
for lower pay.
• With the shift to the right in economic policy, government often lets unions 
know that it sees very high wage demands and long strikes as disruptive 
and costly. Moreover, there is pressure to align wage demands with the 
national inflation targets.
In terms of benefits, union members do far better than other workers. Close to 
nine out of ten union members enjoy an employer contribution to a retirement 
fund, compared to less than one in three non-members. Similar patterns 
emerge for medical aid and paid leave. Union members even benefited more 
from UIF contributions, which are a legal requirement.
Benefits received by union members and non-union members, 2000
Type of non-wage benefit Union members Non-union members
Employer contribution to retirement fund 87% 31%
Employer contribution to medical aid 
scheme 52% 18%
Paid leave 90% 47%
UIF deduction 86% 43%
Source: Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey 2000
In short, unions have made major gains in terms of pay and conditions in the 
past seven years. But it has become increasingly difficult to maintain these 
gains, partly because of changes in employer attitude, partly as a result of 
worsening conditions on the labour market, and partly because of 
conservative economic perspectives from government.
4.1.3 Representation
Representation of members by shop stewards and organisers at the 
workplace is a key function of the union movement -  to protect workers and 
ensure their dignity at work. Unfortunately, it is very difficult to evaluate union
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activities in this field, since the activities take place in the workplace and 
individual dispute-settlement proceedings. COSATU hears about problems in 
some areas -  especially retail and commercial, security and airports -  
because individual workers approach us with complaints. In addition, the 
court cases that some workers have started against their unions point both to 
problems with service and to the growing tendency toward legalism in labour 
relations.
Demands on unions around representation have certainly increased since 
1994. Increased access to legal procedures for grievances and disputes, 
especially through the CCMA, means that shopstewards and organisers need 
much more legal training. At the same time, workers’ expectations have 
increased as they see the potential for greater legal protection.
Restructuring in the public and private sector adds greatly to the demands for 
representation. As Appendix Two indicates, however, COSATU does not 
have a clear framework or training for dealing with restructuring. In these 
circumstances, shopstewards and officials may fail members. Sometimes 
they agree too quickly to employer proposals; sometimes they oppose them 
strongly without having alternatives; and sometimes, because they do not 
feel confident to understand the issues, they do not respond at all, leaving the 
field free for the employer to act.
In terms of individual grievances and disputes, some general data from the 
CCMA indicates the kinds of problems that may arise. Unfortunately, this is 
not a very good indicator. For one thing, the stronger sectors run dispute 
settlement through the bargaining council, not the CCMA. For another, as the 
following table shows, over half of all referrals to the CCMA do not go through 
a union at all. The data do suggest that COSATU affiliates have been much 
more successful in using the CCMA than other federations.
Source of referrals to the CCMA in 2000
Referral source Number of referrals Percentage Referrals
COSATU 8 733 40%
FEDUSA 812 4%
NACTU 802 4%
Independent 11 379 52%
Source: CCMA Information Services Department
Currently, the CCMA finds that over 30 per cent of all referrals are defective 
or fall outside its jurisdiction. It did not, however, give us figures for COSATU 
referrals. Still, the situation points to the need for organisers and 
shopstewards to understand the CCMA procedures and scope.
Referrals are dismissed for reasons such as late application without a 
condonation, failure to exhaust internal processes, and incorrect filling out of 
forms. Sometimes disputes are not classified properly. For instance, 
applicants may try to get the CCMA to accept cases by calling refusal to 
bargain an organisational rights dispute; insolvency or liquidation, unfair 
dismissal; and affirmative action programmes, unfair labour practices.
The CCMA experiences point to the fact that the new legal framework has in 
some ways made workplace representation more difficult, even as the 
opportunities for workers to get a fair hearing have improved. Instead of the 
relatively simple process of mobilising to stop injustice -  which often failed,
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but built solidarity -  shopstewards and organisers must now have the 
capacity to take on the legal system. That means they need back-up from 
their unions in terms of education and legal support, and through the 
establishment of dispute-settlement mechanisms in bargaining councils. They 
also need support from COSATU, which can lobby for simpler dispute- 
settlement procedures and develop educational material to support affiliates’ 
efforts.
4.1.4 Union education
Union education is a key part of service to members and organising in 
general. It must help workers and shop stewards take advantage of labour’s 
legal and policy gains; mobilise members around campaigns; maintain 
COSATU’s political coherence; and provide the information workers need to 
mandate and participate in policy work.
For these reasons, education has always been at the core of COSATU’s 
activities. COSATU’s Education Strategy, however, notes that it has become 
less of an emphasis in recent years, which could have serious implications for 
the long-term strength and unity of the labour movement as well as for union 
service. Indeed, with the increased turnover in shop stewards, education has 
become even more important.
There are now three types of institutions involved in COSATU’s educational 
work: COSATU Education Unit, affiliate educators, and Ditsela. The 
Education Strategy defines the roles of each of these institutions. It argues 
that:
> Affiliates deliver the actual education programmes, in co-operation with 
Federation programmes;
> The Federation supports affiliates by co-ordinating their work, providing 
materials, supporting co-operation between affiliates and generally 
providing technical assistance;
> Ditsela should assist in upgrading educators’ skills and with technical 
aspects of training.
In April 2001, Ditsela surveyed COSATU’s educational capacity for the CEC. 
The study did not examine the impact of union education, but analysed its 
resourcing and content.
The survey concluded that the unions and the Federation need to strengthen 
their resourcing of education. It found that most affiliates as well as COSATU 
itself have two full-time staff members at national level. In a few cases, 
however, for instance at SADTU, the positions are not filled for long periods. 
COSATU also has an educator/organiser in every region. The Secretariat 
Report to the Seventh National Congress suggested that it might be desirable 
to split these posts so as to increase regional capacity.
COSATU has a standing resolution that 10 per cent of unions’ budgets should 
go for education. Virtually all affiliates have a dedicated budget for education, 
although the Ditsela survey could not get accurate figures. Its information 
suggests that COSATU and its affiliates, together, spend over R20 million a 
year on education. It appears, however, that spending per member varies 
wildly between affiliates. About half the unions said their education budget
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was primarily funded from external sources, mostly the SALDT, ITSs and 
domestic and international donors. The education budget of COSATU itself 
has declined over the years.
Most of the unions prioritised basic shop steward training, followed by 
leadership training and education around specific aspects of the labour laws. 
Still, some unions did not provide any basic training for shop stewards, while 
others have an advanced modular approach. SAMWU even starts the 
process during shop-steward elections.
General areas of weakness appear to be induction for staff members and 
training around specific industry issues. Since the survey, however, some 
unions -  notably NUMSA and CEPPWAWU -  have begun to conduct 
workshops on industrial strategy for their sectors. For staff training, NUM and 
FAWU have established extensive programmes through.the Natal Technikon. 
In this area, some unions may rely on Ditsela, which provides a range of 
courses for union staff, rather than providing their own courses.
A further area of weakness has emerged around political education. 
Historically, this was a key force to unify and mobilise workers and ensure the 
ideological coherence of the Federation. Since 1994, however, many affiliates 
have neglected it.
4.1.5 Women empowerment
Women constitute a growing share of the labour force, accounting for almost 
40 per cent of formal workers and just over half of informal workers. But 
women are under-represented in the unions, making up just under 30 per 
cent of members. As a result, of the three million women employees, only 
about a third are organised. Women are even less well represented in union 
leadership and organising departments.
The labour market is heavily gendered, with women historically pushed into 
domestic labour and the service sectors. Women are also much more likely to 
be employed in non-standard work.
The largest single employer of women is retail trade, followed by domestic 
labour and the social services, especially health and education. These three 
sectors alone make up 66 per cent of women’s employment, compared to 37 
per cent of men’s. Men workers are much more evenly distributed between 
industries.
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Employment by gender and industry_____________________
African Total
Men Women Men Women
Total in thousands 4175 3852 6317 5519
Percentage employed in
Wholesale and retail trade 20% 33% 20% 30%
Private households with employed persons 5% 21% 3% 16%
Community, social and personal services 13% 17% 14% 20%
Agriculture, hunting, forestry and fishing 15% 13% 13% 10%
Manufacturing 14% 9% 16% 11%
Financial intermediation, insurance, real estate and business
services 6% 4% 9% 8%
Transport, storage and communication 7% 1% 7% 2%
Construction 9% 1% 8% 1%
Mining and quarrying 9% 0% 8% 0%
Various factors undermine women’s participation in the tabour force and in 
unions. Discrimination in education and employment means that women are 
more likely to be unemployed. Yet most women who do not work are not 
eligible for social grants.
Even if they find work, most women end up with a disproportionate share of 
household labour and child care. But society provides very little support to 
reduce these burdens. Thus, many homes still lack basic infrastructure, and 
women end up having to carry home wood and water. In addition, women 
workers often have difficulty finding affordable child care facilities, and unions 
do not demand consistently that employers provide them. Unreliable and 
unsafe public transport forms another obstacle to women’s participation in 
paid employment as well as the union movement.
The Seventh National Congress established a gender policy with 
mechanisms to increase women’s representation in leadership and within the 
labour market. The April CEC adopted a strategy to take forward the policy 
document. The Organising Unit, specifically the gender co-coordinator, must 
monitor this process.
The gender policy seeks to achieve:
• Improved representation of women in leadership and senior positions 
within the union movement using affirmative action and employment equity 
as a tool.
• A gendered collective bargaining agenda that incorporates parental rights 
(child care, maternity and paternity leave), health and safety issues for 
women, and others. •
• A strategy to remove barriers to participation by women in the union 
movement, including mentorship, training and targets.
Despite the establishment of this strategy, clearly much more needs to be 
done to ensure its implementation.
4.1.6 Socio-Economic Progress
COSATU has played a pivotal role in shaping policy and legislation in a 
democratic South Africa. On balance, the strategy of engagement has paid 
off, despite some setbacks. The Secretariat Report to the Seventh National
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Congress and the first-term report of the Parliamentary Office detail our 
successes and failures.
Certainly members have benefited directly from COSATU’s engagement 
around policy. Key gains relate to labour rights, access to basic services, and 
some aspects of economic policy, for instance skills development and supply- 
side measures. COSATU has also supported measures to strengthen 
democracy, including the Open Democracy Act.
It seems, however, that many members do not understand much of 
COSATU’s policy work. This hinders proper mandating and limits our capacity 
to use power to back up our positions.
A key challenge is to make sure that the many victories that workers have 
scored in the legal and Parliamentary process are translated into concrete 
victories in terms of changes in the workplace and the community. In past 
Congresses, we raised the unions’ inability to exploit gains provided by the 
Constitution and the labour laws. For instance,
> We have not used the BCEA to improve conditions for vulnerable workers.
> Many workplaces do not have Flealth and Safety Committees.
> The skills development strategy is being run by government and business, 
usually without effective labour interventions.
> We have not used the Employment Equity Act adequately to ensure our 
members have real access to opportunities at work.
> We have failed to build centralised bargaining under the LRA.
> We have not utilised the Open Democracy Act and the Competitions Act 
to obtain information from companies, or the laws that protect whistle­
blowers.
That means our victories remain on paper, at least in part, rather than 
benefiting all our members.
4.1.7 Conclusions: The state of service for members —
Improved service to members forms the basis for expanding recruitment in 
new areas. That is critical to counteract downsizing in labour’s traditional 
centres of strength.
The cursory review provided here suggests that in terms of wages, benefits 
and socio-economic policy, unions have made substantial gains for their 
members. But it is becoming increasingly difficult to maintain the tempo of 
victories, as capital regains confidence and unemployment rises. In terms of 
gender, despite strong new policies, progress in meeting women’s special 
needs in the workplace, recruitment and building leadership generally 
remains slow. Finally, in three central areas -  representation, education and 
worker control over decision-making - we do not have the information to make 
a detailed assessment. These areas must form a focus of the proposed 
organisational development project.
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4.2 Strategies to improve services for members
This chapter first looks at how the Federation and affiliates can work together 
to strengthen organising. We then look separately at education, recruitment 
and sectoral unionism as critical ways to build our unions.
4.2.1 Organising
Organising strategies for the Federation and affiliates must take into account 
their different roles. The Federation does not directly serve members. Rather, 
it must help affiliates strengthen their organising efforts. Its main tasks are:
• To establish frameworks for services to members, for instance on 
bargaining structures, wages and benefits, skills development, hours of 
work, HIV, gender, and so on. These frameworks can define basic 
policies, set targets, and develop strategies and tactics. They should 
derive from in-depth discussion by office bearers and officials from 
affiliates and, where relevant, COSATU regions. To this end, COSATU will 
develop background materials and hold meetings where affiliates can 
share experiences and reflect on strategies.
• To supply materials for campaigns and educational work. By centralising 
production, COSATU can cut costs and improve quality. These materials 
must not, however, displace more detailed sectoral material.
• To monitor success with campaigns, provide feedback to affiliates and 
identify cross-cutting problems.
• To provide special support for difficult sectors, especially farm and 
domestic workers. For this purpose, COSATU needs a well-defined 
strategy, which must establish targets and priorities. Otherwise we can 
end up wasting resources.
• To monitor progress in organising and empowering women workers, and 
to develop common strategies in this area.
• To support solidarity across industries, by providing support in major 
disputes through secondary strikes and broader campaigns.
• To support co-ordination within sectors, and ultimately implement the 
principles of one industry -  one union.
Proposals:
1. Ensuring the ideological and practical cohesion of the labour movement 
has become critical for our unity and survival. All our organising and 
education work must reflect Congress resolutions and take forward the 
long term interests of the working class.
2. As part of the next phase of the organisational review effort, leading up to 
the Eighth National Congress, all affiliates must review their systems and 
resourcing for organisers and shop stewards. COSA TU will assist by 
providing an evaluation framework, and if necessary NALEDI will support 
the process. COSA TU will also supported a Federation-wide survey of 
members’ expectations and understanding of union work. Based on this 
analysis, the affiliates can define ways to improve service to members, 
and how COSATU can help. They should amongst others explore the
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possibility of sharing offices and even organisers in smaller towns, in order 
to provide better services at a lower cost.
3. For its part, COSA TU must develop a more informed and strategic 
approach to meeting affiliates’ needs in terms of education programmes, 
campaign materials and policy frameworks. In the next few years its 
support for organising should focus on the following aspects, several of 
which are discussed in more detail below.
• Recruitment in difficult sectors.
• Co-ordination of bargaining strategies across sectors.
• Implementation in the workplace of gains made at the policy level in terms 
of labour laws, skills development, women’s rights, pensions and health 
and safety
• Negotiations around sectoral transformation and industrial strategy
• Consolidating sectoral unions.
4. COSA TU should systematically explore ways for unions to support each 
other during negotiations and strikes, including secondary strikes, boycotts 
and demonstrations. It should develop realistic proposals for strike funds 
at both Federation and affiliate level.
5. COSA TU should set up a system to monitor and evaluate developments 
in shopfloor labour relations, including strikes, negotiations, and the 
activities of the CCMA and bargaining councils.
6. We must set up a national database of shopstewards so as to facilitate the
distribution of material and education as well as regional and local 
organising. _______________
4.2.2 Co-ordinating wage negotiations
At the moment, bargaining is fragmented and left to affiliates. It is impossible 
to assess compliance with the Federation’s demands, such as closing the 
apartheid wage gap.
In order to achieve systematic transformation of labour relations and workers’ 
conditions, COSATU must co-ordinate a strategy across sectors. For this 
reason, we propose a revival of the Living Wage Campaign in a broader form.
Proposals
The revived Living Wage Campaign would have the following elements.
1. The last meeting of the CEC each year would review developments in 
negotiations and set targets and broad strategies for the coming year, 
based on inputs from the COSATU Organising Unit. Affiliates would then 
hold bargaining conferences to determine how to apply these decisions in 
each sector.
2. Targets would relate to implementation of policies, strategies on HIV, and 
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3. The Organising Unit should work with NALEDI to set up a database on 
affiliates’ settlements. Affiliates must submit their settlements to the 
database.
4. The campaign would reinforce the demand for sectoral bargaining in all 
industries.
5. The campaign would help set frameworks for dealing with restructuring, 
including privatisation, outsourcing and mergers, as well ad helping to 
drive engagements on sectoral strategies such as sector summits.
6. Through the campaign, COSA TU would support affiliates by giving 
technical backup to union negotiators where necessary, as well as by 
mobilising solidarity to support unions during negotiations and strikes.
4.2.3 Education
COSATU’s Five-Year Education Strategy provides a guide for COSATU and
the affiliates to improve their work in education.
Proposals:
1. Education must focus on:
> Political education
> Training shop stewards and organisers, including an induction course
> Staff development in terms of the Skills Development Act
> Management training for leadership, including in personnel and financial 
management
> Socio-economic policy.
2. Affiliates and the Federation must implement the resolution to spend 10 
per cent of their budgets on education. They should report their education 
budget to the first CEC of the year. Affiliates should find ways to access 
SETA funding for union education.
3. COSATU’s Education Unit should develop ways to monitor educational 
work and assess its impact.
4. Education should be made more systematic, with a series of programmes 
in each area rather than just once-off workshops and courses.
5. COSA TU’s Education Unit should work with Ditsela to develop courses to 
improve the competencies of union educators.
6. Ditsela must act as a resource centre, providing some training for trainers
and helping develop courses, rather than as a major source of training for 
shopstewards, staff or members._________________________________
4.2.4 Recruitment
With union density at about 40 per cent overall, there is considerable scope
for expanding membership even in sectors that are seeing severe job losses.
We face a twin challenge: to consolidate and expand existing membership
and to reach out to workers in non-standard jobs and the informal economy.
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This means we must make a much more systematic and continuous 
recruitment effort, backed by education and services for new members.
This section first reviews the main categories of poorly organised workers. It 
then puts forward some proposals for strengthening recruitment.
a. Categories of poorly organised workers
We can define several groups of workers that require new forms of 
organisation. To some extent, these categories overlap.
Non-standard workers. In strongly organised sectors, employers may create 
categories of employment that place workers in a weaker relationship to 
management. These strategies include sub-contracting, outsourcing, and 
replacing permanent jobs with casuals, part-time or fixed-term workers. 
Through these strategies, employers create groups of workers that have little 
bargaining power, less job security and worse wages, benefits and conditions 
than permanent workers.
These trends effectively recreate apartheid employment strategies in a new 
form. Because non-standard workers have little job security or prospects of 
more permanent employment, they find it difficult to organise and fight for 
their rights. Very often women, less skilled people, very young and older 
workers are forced into non-standard positions. They are in particularly weak 
positions because discrimination and other factors limit their access to other 
jobs.
Workers in permanent positions often do not see those in non-standard jobs 
as “real” workers. This perception is reinforced by high turnover among non­
standard workers. As a result, organisers and shopstewards may not try to 
recruit non-standard workers or support their demands.
Vulnerable sectors. Farming, domestic labour, construction and some parts 
of retail are vulnerable sectors. They rely heavily on less skilled labour, with 
workers often relatively isolated and disproportionately women or youth. In 
these sectors, the labour process, working conditions, and production cycles 
combine to make it difficult to build stable organisation or maintain 
membership.
The informal sector. The informal sector constitutes economic activities that 
take place outside state regulation. Informal enterprises do not pay tax, UIF 
or workers’ compensation.
The vast majority of informal workers are self-employed, as the following 
table shows. This makes organisation extraordinarily difficult. Yet many 
apparently self-employed informal workers are in fact controlled by suppliers. 
In clothing and footwear, formal enterprises outsource production to 
individuals on an informal, piecework basis, in order to circumvent workers’ 
rights and collective bargaining structures.
Nature of employment by formal and informal sector
Employment status Formal Informal
Total in thousands 7435 3329
93%
0%
Percentage that is: 
Working for someone else 
Subsistence farmer




Partnership or sole owner, including commercial farmers - 6% 33%
Domestic worker, gardener or security guard 0% 4%
Unpaid work in a family business 0% 4%
Source: Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey, February 2001, Table 3.11
White-Collar Workers. As a result of the growth in the service sector, white- 
collar work forms one of the few areas of employment growth in the economy.
In the public service, nurses and teachers alone make up half of total 
employment.
As the following table indicates, white-collar workers are by no means 
homogenous. Clerical workers and sales assistants generally do not have a 
tertiary degree and are often poorly paid. In contrast, professionals with 
degrees are amongst the best-paid workers in the country.













Total 11 880 000 100% 52% 4%
Legislators, senior officials and managers 626 000 5% 12% 27%
Professionals 437 000 4% 0% 22%
Technical and associate professionals 1 054 000 9% 12% 6%
Clerks 1 043 000 9% 17% 2%
Service workers and shop and market sales workers 1 347 000 11% 47% 3%
Skilled agricultural and fishery workers 1 667 000 14% 94% 1%
Craft and related trades workers 1 435 000 12% 41% 3%
Plant and machine operators and assemblers 1 131 000 10% 32% 1%
Elementary occupation 2 102 000 18% 71% 1%
Domestic workers 1 001 000 8% 94% 0%
Source: Statistics South Africa, Labour Force Survey, Table 3.10
Historically, white-collar workers at all levels saw themselves as separate 
from the working class. They may still not appreciate the benefits of collective 
action and militancy. Moreover, at the upper ends of the scale, professionals 
and managers have more in common with capital than with the working class.
The September Commission identifies three mechanisms for attracting white- 
collar workers:
• Establishing new unions or separate sections in existing unions. COSATU 
has already effectively accepted this, at least as a temporary measure, by 
permitting unions that limit membership to professionals, such as SADTU 
and DENOSA. We need to debate how to manage a transition to sectoral 
unionism without alienating members of these unions. •
• Developing new strategies and skills, possibly with new staff, to provide 
services for higher-level workers. This approach would ensure that union 
officials have the necessary skills, knowledge of the work, and 
understanding of grievances. In effect, unions would employ workers with 
a white-collar background as officials and organisers. This could have 
implications for the pay structure of most COSATU unions.
• Changing the culture of our affiliates and Federation. Professionals often 
have a more individualistic culture or professional ethos, identify with their
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employers, and are less willing to take action against employer and state. 
We need to think carefully about how far we can go to accommodate the 
aspirations and interests of these layers of workers.
The risk with all these mechanisms is that COSATU weakens the very 
sources of its strength -  its working class base, worker control and militancy.
Women. Women workers are more likely to be found in non-standard 
employment and domestic labour, as discussed earlier. We need special 
strategies to recruit them, in part by demonstrating that unions will negotiate 
to meet their needs in the workplace.
Young Workers. The youth face the highest levels of unemployment, and 
may therefore seem less important for recruitment. But young workers are the 
future. Unions need a mix of experienced and young workers to maintain their 
strength. COSATU should therefore target young people for recruitment.
b. Rethinking the recruitment drive
Recruitment must become an all-year activity, rather than an annual event. It 
must be properly resourced, with dedicated staff, and backed up by strong 
services for new members. In addition, we need to develop strategies for 
dealing with hard-to-organise groups.
In line with the recommendations of the September Commission, the Sixth 
National Congress resolved that COSATU should embark on an annual mass 
recruitment campaign. Since then, two campaigns have been held, with a 
third planned for October 2001. According to NALEDI figures, past campaigns 
resulted in about 50 000 new members. The first campaign was, however, 
much more successful than the second.
The annual campaign has apparently become a substitute for a consistent 
recruitment effort. With few exceptions, union recruitment strategies are 
under-resourced to non-existent. It seems that only NEHAWU has a 
dedicated recruitment officer. Generally, recruitment still falls to organisers, 
who also have a host of other responsibilities serving existing members.
(
Proposals
1. The annual recruitment campaign should be retained but targeted toward 
specific sectors. This campaign should supplement, not replace, affiliates’ 
recruitment campaigns. The COSATU organising department can work 
with some of the new affiliates in conceptualising and implementing 
recruitment strategies.
2. COSA TU must set an overall target for recruitment each year, broken 
down by affiliate. In that context, affiliates must develop thSir own plans, 
with targets for specific sections of workers. They must dedicate personnel 
and funding to carry out these plans.
3. COSA TU’s organising department must support and monitor the affiliates’
recruitment plans. It should lead a co-ordinated effort to improve 
membership systems. To that end, it must kick-start a process to 
enumerate COSATU’s members in terms of industry, occupation, gender, 
age and race. _____
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4.2.5 One Union, One Industry
The concept of sectoral unionism -  building one union for each industry -  
aims to ensure both large and sustainable unions and adequate expertise in 
sectoral requirements. This concept is particularly important now as job 
losses make some historic union sectors less viable.
The proposal for super unions was adopted at both the Sixth and Seventh 
National Congress. Progress has, however, been slow. The reasons include 
the lack of a well-defined plan to implement the Congress resolutions in 
stages, and concerns from leadership, who fear the unknown as well as the 
possible toss of position and power. More generally, any union merger 
requires careful adjustment of organisational structures and change 
management in order to avoid unnecessary conflict and disruption.
The September Commission and the Secretariat Report to the Seventh 
National Congress argued for super unions on the basis that a sustainable 
union in today’s economy must have at least 100 000 members. The 
following table indicates the unions that, by this measure, are now at risk.
The table below gives only a static view. Some of the unions have scope for 
growth, for very different reasons -  although in every case, only if they make 
major recruitment efforts. To take some examples: •
• The police and corrections sector is almost evenly split between POPCRU 
and SAPU. A sectoral union would have membership of well over 100 000.
• CEPPWAWU membership is quite small compared to employment in the 
manufacturing sectors it covers.
4. COSATU’s Organising Unit must develop a comprehensive strategy to 
implement the Seventh National Congress policy for recruiting new and 
vulnerable workers. It must include:
• A clear role for regional organisers in supporting efforts to organise 
domestic, farm and other vulnerable workers.
• Proposals for government interventions to improve vulnerable workers’ job 
security and skills, to set minimum wages and conditions and, ultimately, 
to secure centralised bargaining for vulnerable sectors like farm and 
domestic workers. In the long run, that is the best way to improve the 
conditions for organising these workers.
• Ways COSATU can help affiliates develop more appropriate strategies 
and tactics by learning from each other and from foreign experiences.
• As far as possible, systems for monitoring affiliates’ work in this area and 
evaluating progress.
• An evaluation of the possibility of establishing service centres in the 
regions to reach out to workers in the informal sector as well as domestic 
and farm workers. Advice centres would both help reduce the cost of 
serving these workers, and let workers get help from unions even if 
vulnerability at work means they cannot join.
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• If COSATU’s industrial strategy succeeds, food processing would become 
a major area of employment growth, which could give FAWU the scope to 
expand.
In contrast, SASAWU and SADNU have virtually the same scope as 
NEFIAWU, which limits their potential for expansion. PAWE and SAFPU have 
limited potential recruitment pools. And as long as CWU is focused on the 
Post Office and Telkom, they also have little scope for growth.
Unions with mem be rs hip below 100 000










But the proposed super unions also have some problems. They rely on very 
broadly defined sectors, which unite several diverse sub-sectors. This means 
that, unless very carefully managed, the unions could become unwieldy and 
insensitive to sectoral requirements. This could weaken engagement around 
industrial strategy. Furthermore, the public sector is defined, not by its outputs 
-  the traditional definition for a sector -  but by the nature of the employer.
The following table shows that the public sector and manufacturing unions 
would be very large indeed. NUM, which is currently COSATU’s largest 
union, would become a small fish by comparison.
Membership of the super unions
Super Union Affiliates Membership
Public sector NEHAWU, POPCRU, SADNU, SADTU, SAMWU, 
SASAWU
670 000
Manufacturing CEPPWAWU, FAWU, NUMSA, SAAPAWU, SACTWU 535 000




The super unions are expected to have sub-sectors, rather than acting as 
fully homogenous sectoral unions. To ensure that they can function properly 
requires more systematic discussion about their internal structure and the 
specific relationships between their sub-sectors.
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Security POPCRU 71 000
Without defence, the entire public 
security sector numbers around 150 
000
Local government SAMWU 120 000 Retains electricity reticulation
Education SADTU 219 000 Include non-educators in education, increasing scope by about 100 000
Health and public 
administration
SASAWU, SADNU, 
NEHAWU, DENOSA 291 000
Includes both private and public 





infrastructure CWU, SATAWU 138 000
Logically, this could include 
electricity
Services and retail PAWE, SACCAWU, SASBO, SAFPU 168 000
SACCAWU has not modified its 
membership figures since 1994
Mining, energy 
and construction NUM 290 000
Electricity generation would go to 
NUM, as agreed
Manufacturing
Chemical CEPPWAWU 74 000 Intensify efforts to increase membership within sector
Metal work NUMSA 200 000
Agriculture and 
food FAWU, SAAPAWU 141 000
Clothing SACTWU 120 000
Whatever the final decision on demarcation, we need to explore forms of co­
operation in addition to a full merger. Co-operation between unions may 
become necessary because they have a common employer or operate in 
related sectors. For instance, the public-service unions now co-operate 
through a joint committee on wage bargaining. In electricity, NUM, NUMSA 
and SAMWU have a well-defined caucus to negotiate restructuring. Where 
relevant, too, COSATU has encouraged co-operation between affiliates on 
- sector job summits.
Proposals on demarcation must also take into account the relationship to 
other federations and unions. Over the last few years, COSATU, FEDUSA 
and NACTU have worked closely together in NEDLAC and international 
institutions like ICFTU-AFRO.
COSATU has a long-standing commitment to a single national federation. We 
have been growing closer to NACTU in terms of economic policy and our 
long-term vision. In contrast, despite some improvements in co-operation with 
FEDUSA, big ideological differences remain. These differences appear for 
instance in deep-seated disagreements about industrial and fiscal policy.
They are based in part on the fact that FEDUSA tends to focus on salaried 
employees, without making serious efforts to represent lower level African 
workers.
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Proposals:
1. The Central Committee should discuss:
> What sectoral delineation makes sense for strong union organisations? 
Should we have a social service union, or continue to have a public- 
service union? A social service union would consist of public and private 
health, education, welfare and public administration sections.
> How should the sub-sectors relate within a super union ?
> What is the maximum desirable size for a union and a super-union?
> How should COSA TU manage affiliates that are now defined in terms of 
occupations and professions, rather than industries?
2. Based on the CC discussions, COSATU’s Organising Unit should develop 
more detailed proposals on the super unions. The proposals should 
include an assessment of the probable membership and potential for 
growth of each affiliate, and a process of phasing in the super unions.
3. The Organising Unit should define areas where special forms of co­
operation are needed between affiliates, and propose structures to 
achieve that co-operation.
4. The Organising Unit should develop a programme of action for submission
to the CEO on how to achieve a more unified labour movement._________
4.3 Confronting Unemployment
As discussed in Chapter Two, the destruction of jobs over the past decade 
represents perhaps the biggest threat to organised labour. The damage goes 
beyond lost membership in the worst affected sectors. All organised workers 
have to worry that employers will be able to use unemployed people to 
undercut their conditions.
This section proposes three strategies for dealing with the problem: an active 
industrial strategy, social protection and community solidarity, and greater 
efforts to organise the unemployed.
4.3.1 Industrial strategy
Ultimately, employment creation depends on a new growth path being 
adopted, with an active industrial strategy as one of the elements. To 
understand the potential benefits of an active industrial strategy, we need to 
understand the structural weaknesses of the South African economy. They 
include:
• The historic reliance on mining, especially gold. The main source of 
wealth in the economy is declining, while minerals production for export is 
highly capital intensive and therefore creates few jobs. Even today, well 
over half our exports are minerals.
• Massive income inequalities, which limit the domestic market and reduce 
overall productivity. Business generally sees exports as the alternative.
But exports have not created jobs on a large scale, in part because of the 
emphasis on minerals. In manufacturing, efforts to increase exports have
(
<
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often started with job cuts. Besides, most of our manufacturing exports go 
to the region, which is hardly a stable prospect.
Worldwide, successful exporting economies invariably started by 
improving equality and expanding the domestic market. That provides a 
strong domestic base, so that exports are less vulnerable to international 
fluctuations.
• The South African economy is still dominated by a relatively small number 
of mining houses and financial institutions. These companies generally 
see themselves as part of the world mining and finance scene. As 
opportunities in those fields run out in South Africa, they have tended to 
look abroad. Since 1994, R54 billion has left the country in foreign direct 
investment, compared to an inflow of R45 billion.
Government’s response to these structural problems has been at best 
contradictory. On the one hand, especially between 1994 and 1996, we saw a 
commitment to improving services for black communities, protecting labour 
rights, developing skills, and supporting small and micro enterprise. On the 
other, especially after GEAR, government cut its spending, looked to private 
provision of basic services, slashed tariffs and deregulated markets wherever 
possible.
To overcome our economic malaise requires a much more structured and 
coherent development strategy. Key elements include:
• Consistent support for relatively labour-intensive sectors that can create 
jobs directly and indirectly. Many of these would meet basic needs more 
efficiently, which should raise living standards. Examples include 
agriculture and food production, transport and household infrastructure, 
and private and social services.
This approach requires a more balanced approach to exports. We cannot 
afford more billion-rand export projects that, like Coega, are justified by 
vague and unfulfilled promises that they will create jobs indirectly.
• Strategies to expand the domestic market through employment creation, 
more relaxed fiscal and monetary policies, and targeted procurement 
measures. Government infrastructure and social programmes must 
maximise job creation both directly and indirectly. For instance, locating 
houses far from work raises the cost of labour and aggravates 
unemployment. Government must help address unemployment by 
expanding both public works and community service programmes, as 
discussed below.
• More equitable asset distribution can be achieved through large-scale 
skills development, government services and infrastructure for the poor, 
support for SMMEs and land reform. In contrast, current programmes of 
privatisation and budget cuts reinforce existing inequalities.
Above all, an effective development strategy must meet the diverse 
requirements of economic sectors. This type of strategy has never emerged 
from the back rooms of government. As the South East Asian experience 
demonstrates, they require in-depth consultation with sectoral stakeholders. 
Only that can generate practical policies. For this reason, the process of
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sector job summits and the discussions on industrial.policy now underway at 
NEDLAC are critical.
Together with NUMSA, CEPPWAWU, FAWU and SACCAWU, COSATU and 
NALEDI have established an industrial strategy project in an effort to meet 
these organisational requirements. The project locates researchers within 
each affiliate. COSATU and NALEDI provide technical support. COSATU 
tries to provide an overall framework and co-ordination.
In addition to this focused project, COSATU has made a commitment to 
helping affiliates share experiences and ideas, and to monitoring overall 
progress. For this reason, it has held fairly regular meetings, where 
representatives of affiliates can discuss the process.
c
4.3.2 Social protection
Social protection refers to the full range of measures designed to combat 
poverty, including welfare grants, the provision of basic infrastructure and 
social services, and social insurance schemes like the UIF. An adequate 
social protection system would reduce the pressure on unemployed people 
and, by extension, workers.
In dealing with unemployment, government-sponsored jobs programmes are 
particularly important. These programmes centre on public works and 
community services, in part by establishing youth brigades.. They aim to 
improve living standards while providing a livelihood for the poor.
This type of programme can provide relatively low-level employment 
combined with skills development, as in some public works programmes. In 
addition, community services can be run as a volunteer programme, training 
and a small stipend as a way to give unemployed people, especially youth, a 
meaningful occupation. These programmes could mobilise tens of thousands 
of people, for instance to help with ABET, child care and support for people 
with HIV.
Proposals
1. We need to ensure that all affiliates develop capacity to engage in the 
process of restructuring the economy. At the same time, we must 
recognise that this is a long-term process, which will not deliver results for 
several years, at best.
The key capacity needs are:
> Technical capacity that can work with shopstewards and office bearers to 
develop sectoral proposals that will create jobs.
> Education and mandating structures that ensure involvement of 
shopstewards and members on a large scale. Otherwise labour can end 
up with an overall technical approach that rules out the use of power.
> Negotiations teams with sufficient understanding, time and expertise.
> Ways to link demands and campaigns around skills development -  an
area of weakness for most affiliates -  with proposals on industrial 
strategy. _________________
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4.3.3 Organising the unemployed
Recently, we have witnessed the emergence of organisations representing 
the unemployed. Some of these organisations are being manipulated by the 
DA to achieve its political ends. Invariably, this involves a campaign to reduce 
labour standards, with the contention that then employers will create more 
jobs. In short, this approach is transparently divisive.
We need to explore more effective ways to organise the unemployed in order 
to combat this tendency.
Proposals
Unions must explore ways to organise the unemployed. The Central 
Committee should discuss the following options:
1. Unions could find ways to extend their services to former members who 
lose their jobs. NUM has piloted this approach with the Mineworkers 
Development Agency, which establishes co-ops and other projects to 
provide employment to former miners. At a more modest level, unions 
could do more to assist former members to access support services, such 
as training and the UIF. Unions have to decide, however, how much of 
their resources they can dedicate to former members, who will not be able 
to contribute to their income. Already, the 7th Congress adopted a 
resolution urging unions to review their constitution regarding the status of 
former members. Affiliates should have achieved this objective by the 8>h 
National Congress in 2003.
2. COSA TU could explore options for assisting organisations of the 
unemployed. In the past, this approach was attempted without much 
success. The Organising Unit should provide a detailed analysis of these 
experiences and suggest options that could work better.
3. COSA TU could create an organisation of the unemployed linked to 
COSATU.
(
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Chapter 5. Transforming the Engines of COSATU -  Review of 
Organisational Structures
The aim of this section is to review COSATU’s structures, both the decision­
making or policy structures and operational ones. We focus mainly on the 
Federation itself.
When we evaluate structure we need to bear in mind the following questions:
• Do they give expression to the core values of the organisation?
• Are they efficient and effective? Do they ensure the allocation of resources 
in line with our main priorities?
• Do the functions have integrity and focus?
• Are they capable of cutting across functional compartments where 
necessary?
If a structure is weak, we need to decide if it is because of the way it is 
organised or because of poor resourcing. Generally, we must ensure that our 
core values -  above all worker control -  are incorporated in any reforms. A 
failure to do this could make our structures seem more efficient in the short 
run, but weaken COSATU as a whole in the long term.
Overall, we can identify three structural problems:
1. Duplication and fragmentation of Constitutional structures.
2. The tendency to expand capacity for policy development and engagement 
without matching growth in education and organising capacity.
3. The poor definition of the Federation’s role in supporting troubled affiliates 
and ensuring adherence to Federation policies on demarcation.
4.1 National Constitutional Structures
Constitutional structures are the representative structures of affiliates and 
regions that develop COSATU policy and mandate key engagements. They 
include the National Congress, the Central Committee and the Central 
Executive Committee. This also includes the substructures of the CEC and 
the COSATU regions, which develop policy within nationally, defined norms 
and standards.
Appendix Three illustrates the complexity of COSATU’s constitutional 
structures and the changes as a result of our proposals. It shows that the 
National Congress delegates powers to the CC and the CEC. In turn, the 
CEC gives management and administrative functions to the EXCO. It also 
has a number of committees. The National Gender Committee, Fincom and 
Nedcom are established by COSATU’s Constitution; the CEC Commissions, 
NEDLAC negotiations teams and the Investment Council were set up by the 
National Congress and the CEC itself. All of these structures are made up of 
affiliate and regional representatives, both worker leaders and officials.
The National Office Bearers (NOBs) form the link between constitutional and 
operational structures. COSATU has a President, First Vice President, 
Second Vice President, Treasurer, General Secretary and Deputy General
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Secretary. The Presidents and Treasurer remain in their original workplaces, 
and as worker leaders provide overall political oversight. The General 
Secretary and the Deputy General Secretary are full-time at COSATU and 
have executive powers. They are responsible for day-to-day operations and 
management.
We now indicate some weaknesses in these structures.
4.1.1 Representative structures
The National Congress and Central Committee have generally functioned 
well. Increasingly, however, resolutions have dealt with complex policy and 
organisational issues. To ensure full participation by delegates, we need to 
strengthen preparation for their meetings.
In theory, the CEC and EXCO have different functions and composition. 
Representation in the CEC by affiliates is largely proportional to their 
membership, and it is supposed to make key decisions on policy and 
resourcing. It meets twice a year. In contrast, every affiliate has two 
representatives to EXCO, which is expected to focus on implementation of 
CEC mandates and meets every month.
The expansion in policy engagement has made the division of labour 
between the CEC and EXCO largely irrelevant. The CEC meets to 
infrequently to manage urgent policy issues. Instead, EXCO ends up guiding 
policy engagement to a large degree. The CEC’s only unique responsibilities 
are the adoption of budgets and audited statements, and the creation of new 
staff positions. Even in these areas, the CEC often mandates EXCO to make 
the final decision.
The monthly meetings of EXCO place heavy burdens on the Secretariat. 
Before the ink dries on the report and minutes of the previous EXCO, it must 
begin to prepare for the next one.
Finally, a tendency has emerged for some affiliates to skimp on preparation 
for EXCO and CEC meetings. In some cases, the General Secretary does not 
distribute documentation to the worker NOBs who attend. Due to poor 
preparation and prior discussions, affiliates often do not have mandates for 
the issues on the agenda.
As Appendix Three shows, the CEC has a number of sub-committees, some 
of which are defined in the Constitution. Their roles include developing broad 
policies on education, finances and gender issues for adoption by the CEC 
and monitoring implementation of these decisions.
Some of the CEC sub-committees have suffered from consistently poor 
attendance. The main problems have emerged in Fincom, the CEC 
Commissions and the Investment Council.
The difficulty of getting a quorum at Fincom has led to administrative 
weaknesses. For this reason, the COSATU Secretariat proposed, in 
particular, that Fincom be replaced with a smaller CEC Committee on 
Finances.
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Proposals
1. To improve the functioning of constitutional structures,
> COSATU must ensure timely preparation of its reports, and provide them 
in an accessible format.
> All affiliates must ensure regular mandating and report-back processes, 
with prompt and full distribution of materials for CEC meetings.
> The EXCO be eliminated and the CEC meet more frequently, for instance 
every two months.
2. For Congresses and Central Committee meetings,
> Affiliates must consult widely with membership, for instance through 
workers’ forums, and hold pre-conference meetings. The COSATU 
regions must facilitate this process.
> Affiliates must submit resolutions in time to ensure timely circulation of 
consolidated versions. Otherwise the main debate takes place in the
Resolutions Committee, undermining the full democratic process. (
3. The Central Committee should discuss whether Congresses should have 
commissions, so that delegates can discuss key issues in more detail.
4. To improve the work of substructures of constitutional meetings:
> The CEC evaluate the overall structure of its committees and 
commissions, analyse factors behind poor attendance, and propose a 
more rational and effective structure.
> Fincom should be replaced by a CEC Committee on Finances.
> Members of the CEC Commissions should be allowed to send mandated
alternates if they cannot attend.___________________________________
4.1.2 NOBs
The commitment to worker control shaped COSATU’s leadership structure, 
which is unique in the world. In the American AFL-CIO, the president is 
unquestionably and clearly the leader. In the British TUC, the leader is the 
General Secretary. In South Africa, in contrast, there is a balance. The 
President is regarded as the political head while the General Secretary acts 
as the engine of th« organisation, with considerable executive powers under 
the constitution. The President and worker NOBs play a political oversight 
role whereas the Secretaries manage the movement on daily basis.
This model has enormous benefits. It forces collective leadership and 
discourages individualism. The emergence of general secretaries with origins 
in the labour movement and of full-time worker NOBs should work to entrench 
this collectivity. Where NOBs meetings were held only once every month or 
two, today most NOBs meetings take place weekly or fortnightly. Besides 
reinforcing collective responsibility, this means worker NOB can be better 
briefed and exercise more effective political oversight.
This system is not without problems, however. In particular, because of 
distance, worker leaders are not always able to play an effective oversight 
role. That can leave the Secretariat effectively to act as the political
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leadership. In some affiliates, too, and even in COSATU in the past, an 
unclear division of responsibilities and personality dynamics has led to 
endless clashes among the NOBs.
For COSATU itself, Congress resolved that worker NOBs should be available 
on a full-time basis to do COSATU’s work while remaining on their company’s 
payroll. This system has not worked very well, essentially due to the failure to 
set up coherent systems of collective management and support. The 
problems are aggravated by the lack of a clear division of worker NOBs’ time 
between their union and the Federation.
Proposals
1. Worker NOBs should not be responsible for day-to-day operations, but 
rather for strategic intervention in policy and organisational work, at a high 
level.
2. Worker NOBs of the Federation should develop very clear guidelines for 
how they split their time and effort between the Federation and their 
affiliate. The guidelines should take into account the needs of both 
organisations, making sure that the responsibilities given the NOB are 
realistic.
3. COSATU NOBs must collectively decide on the allocation of work 
between themselves, and obtain approval from the CEC. Worker leaders 
would then take special responsibility for particular issues, without losing 
their overall political oversight role. They would focus on major forums for 
engagement, such as the Alliance and NEDLAC, and on organising, for 
instance working to strengthen regional strategies and recruitment 
campaigns.
4. The General Secretary must ensure much more consistent briefing around 
key policy engagements and organising tasks. The NOBs must then 
collectively exercise normal, systematic management by setting clear 
targets and monitoring their progress.
5. The General Secretary remains responsible for COS A TU’s deployment of 
staff and the budget. That means that worker NOBs must discuss any 
proposal to use COSA TU resources with the General Secretary, to avoid 
overburdening staff and disorganising expenditure.
4.2 COSATU regions and locals
The COSATU regions and locals were originally established to support the 
implementation of central decisions and the practical solidarity and co­
ordination of affiliates. For this reason, they have limited resources and 
virtually no policy capacity.
Four factors make this approach somewhat contradictory.
1. The role of the regions in organising is not very well defined. The work of 
the Secretary and the educator/organiser over overlaps, causing 
duplication and conflict.
2. Regions and locals are headed by office-bearers who are elected in their 
own right. Regional office bearers participate in the CEC. Elected 
leadership is important for maintaining cohesion and authority, but
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suggests that the role of regions and locals in policy making at national 
and regional level should be better defined.
3. The establishment of provinces and local governments with semi­
independent developmental functions means that there is pressure on the 
regions and locals to engage, especially around budgets and development 
initiatives.
4. Programmes initiated at a national level do not necessarily take the 
capacity of the regions into account. Regional educator/organisers, in 
particular, can spend considerable time in head office meetings, leading to 
tension over their accountability to the region. Moreover, national 
campaigns and programmes require that the regions expand support for 
locals.
The Central Executive Committee resolved that COSATU should develop a 
national programme for locals. It said that the regions should continue 
supporting the locals, with the aid of the head office.
We also need to explore the possibility of strengthening the role of locals and 
regions in organising work. Locals could play a pivotal role in organising the 
unemployed as well as groups that are difficult to organise such as domestic 
and farm workers. In this context, they could serve as advice centres for 
workers on a wide range of issues. Regions could help rationalise 
organisational and educational work for affiliates by setting up systems to 
share resources such as staff and offices.
Proposals
1. The role of the regions and locals be debated and clearly defined. For this 
purpose, the Secretariat should hold a strategic workshop with regional 
representatives. It should submit proposals to the CEC by the end of 2002, 
including a national programme for locals.
2. The resourcing of the regions and locals must be aligned with these 
proposals. Where necessary and affordable, for instance in the bigger or 
more complex regions, CGSATU should establish an extra position to 
permit the separation of organising and education responsibilities.
3. Based on the decision on the role of the regions, head office units must be 
given clear responsibilities for supporting regional work by developing 
policy framework and assisting with expertise, as necessary.
4. The organising department should undertake a demarcation exercise that
examines the implications of changes to align more with current political 
boundaries. The analysis should take into account membership, 
resourcing and the distances covered. Its proposals should be debated by 
the CEC and submitted to the Eight National Congress.________________
4.3 Affiliates and COSATU
The relationship between COSATU and affiliates has three problem areas: 
weak definition of when COSATU can intervene in an affiliate; different 
structures in terms of responsibilities and regions; and unclear relationships 
around policy development and engagement.
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A critical role of the Federation is to support weaker affiliates and to ensure 
appropriate demarcation. The functions of COSATU in this regard remain 
poorly spelt out, which can cause unnecessary tension. We need to define its 
role in supporting affiliates, resolving disputes and intervening where affiliate 
an affiliate is in crisis or is undermining COSATU policy.
Structural mismatches arise in terms of organisational and spatial structures. 
The affiliates do not always have structures aligned with those of the 
Federation, especially around policy development. Thus, not all affiliates have 
health and safety co-ordinators or skills development positions. Moreover, 
some are organised around provinces and others are not. These 
discrepancies make co-ordination more difficult. We need to discuss whether 
there should be efforts to align structures more closely.
Finally, the role of affiliates in developing and engaging ..on policy remains 
poorly defined. Ideally, any major new policy process should involve inputs 
from the affiliates, and engagement on their sectoral issues must include their 
representatives. For instance, work on electricity involves affiliates who 
organise in the sector as well as COSATU, since the issue affects labour as 
whole.
It appears that in practice, some COSATU policy processes do not sufficiently 
involve the relevant affiliates. In part, this reflects the affiliates’ lack of 
capacity. But it also arises because of a lack of clear procedures and 
structures to ensure consultation and mandating. The result can be 
duplication of work, inconsistent positions in negotiations, and conflict.
Proposals
1. COSATU must implement the Sixth National Congress resolution on 
interventions when an affiliate:
> Experiences a deep political conflict that creates a crisis in the union.
> Experiences a serious administrative or organisational crisis.
> Adopts or implements policies that contradicts COSA TU positions.
> Cannot grow or reach large groups of workers in their sector because of a 
lack of resources or inability to develop or implement appropriate 
strategies.
> Does not adhere to demarcation decisions.
2. The nature of the intervention should depend on the crisis:
> In the case of political conflict or disagreements on policy, COSATU and 
affiliate NOBs must intervene.
> For internal administrative or organisational problems, a team with 
appropriate expertise, led by an NOB, should provide support.
> The organising committee is responsible for supporting weak affiliates, 
based on strategies established by the Secretariat.
> Demarcation disputes should be handled by a demarcation committee 
established by the CEC and consisting of a COSATU NOB and two 
affiliate General Secretaries.
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3. COSATU’s Organising Unit must develop an induction programme for new 
affiliates, with timeframes, that includes
> education for shopstewards and officials as well as leadership on 
COSATU’s principles, history and major programmes and aims, and
> indicates when and how new affiliates must adhere to COSA TU 
Constitutional principles.
4. As far as possible, affiliates should inform the COSATU Secretariat of 
which officials should be consulted on policy issues.
5. The COSA TU Policy Unit and Parliamentary Office should routinely inform
affiliates about policy proposals or submissions that relate to their sectors, 
and set up structures to facilitate co-operation where appropriate. _______
4.4 Head office structure
As noted in Chapter 2, the structure of COSATU has grown and changed 
largely in response to escalating demands on policy engagement. This has 
led to a certain disjuncture between policy development, through the Policy 
Unit and the Parliamentary Office in particular, and education and organising 
work.
The September Commission (pp. 214-17) advanced various proposals with 
regard to policy development, organising, education and communications.
Only the proposal on policy development was taken forward systematically.
Unresolved questions include:
1. The process for prioritising policy engagements so as to take into account 
the needs of the education, campaigns and organising departments.
2. The role of the different units in developing material to popularise policy 
demands.
3. Responsibilities around specific areas such as HIV (which falls between 
Health and Safety and campaigns) and skills development, which could go 
to education or the Policy Unit.
(
Proposal
As part of the organisational review process proposed in Chapter 1, COSATU 
units must be reviewed to check their alignment, functions and resources. At 
the end of such a process there should be a detailed report and plan to 
restructure the units where necessary.
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Chapter 6. Building Leadership and Democratic Management
Unionists often do not discuss poor management -  after all, unions are 
working class organisations and management is the enemy. However, large 
organisations do not manage themselves. Improved management is critical 
for unions to serve their members.
Management of an organisation has several components:
1. Overall strategic management, which involves setting key priorities, 
ensuring co-ordination, monitoring implementation and dealing with 
blockages.
2. Personnel management -  that is, ensuring the allocation of posts and 
tasks according to organisational priorities; recruiting, and retaining 
competent staff; monitoring staff members and on that basis helping them 
improve their work and skills; motivating staff, in part by ensuring that they 
feel empowered and appreciated on the job.
3. Financial management, which means allocating funds according to 
priorities and making sure that accounting systems function well.
The labour movement faces particular organisational challenges. On the one 
hand, our management systems must ultimately ensure worker control. That 
requires time-consuming decision-making and report-back procedures. On 
the other, NOBs, shop stewards and members undertake a range of functions 
for the organisation, even though they are not employees. These activities 
also have to be co-ordinated and supported, making for particularly complex 
financial and personnel systems.
The September Commission noted a range of weaknesses in union 
management. Too often union leadership fails to prioritise organisational and 
management issues, does not follow or implement a long-term development 
strategy, does not supervise staff and is not committed to improving 
management. Too many senior staff simply abandon their managerial 
responsibilities. Some foster a top-down, hierarchical and undemocratic form 
of organisation, which disempowers staff and stifles creativity. Others adopt 
an unpredictable, ad hoc style. Many spend most of their time in policy 
meetings, negotiations and political activities, and very little in ensuring that 
the organisation is functioning effectively.
The result of this kind of management may be inefficiency, low morale, lack of 
teamwork, lack of innovation or initiative, and “ad-hoc-ism” and “last minute- 
ism” at all levels of the organisation. This kind of management style creates 
opportunities where staff members can be absent, get involved in power 
plays, and undermine service systems.
We do not know enough about each affiliate’s management systems. That is 
a key reason for the organisational review project. We here propose ideas 
and processes to bring about improvement. But these recommendations will 
not apply equally to all affiliates. They merely aim to stimulate ideas around 
more specific solutions in the affiliates and in COSATU itself.
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We propose three main strategies for dealing with management problems: 
establishing a clear vision for union management, improving training for the 
Secretariat and heads of units, and a financial management project.
6.1 A model of union management
As unions grow bigger, they need effective management to ensure that they 
serve their members efficiently. The main challenge lies in ensuring worker 
control without overburdening NOBs with trivial decisions; aligning union staff 
and budgets around priorities for the labour movement; and motivating 
employees.
Good management in the union movement faces specific obstacles.
1. Resolutions set a vast number of tasks, often without taking capacity into 
account.
2. When they are elected, many general secretaries have not had training or 
even much experience in management. Their strengths typically lie in 
negotiations, organising, policy development and education, plus 
enormous commitment and sheer hard work. Relatively few have 
experience in financial or personnel management. Union officials often 
face gaps in their competencies.
3. A contradiction may arise between letting officials show initiative and 
worker control. As the political heads of the organisation, NOBs cannot let 
officials set the agenda. They must ensure worker control over the union 
at all costs. Yet if they do not give officials some freedom to make 
decisions in their field, morale will certainly suffer. A two-caste system can 
emerge, where officials feel dehumanised and oppressed.
4. Rapid changes in staffing aggravates management problems. It 
destabilises financial systems and requires more decentralised processes. 
Too often, we have inherited systems where the Secretariat is responsible 
for micro-managing departments -  carrying out personnel assessment, 
drawing up budgets, and giving day-to-day guidance. Where unions have 
grown rapidly, these functions can prove overwhelming, distracting 
leadership from their strategic task.
5. Finally, where union membership is growing or shrinking rapidly, their 
resourcing may become more uncertain. This makes consistent 
management more difficult.
To deal with these problems, we propose the following broad guidelines for 
union management. These guidelines essentially seek to provide a 
systematic overview of practices that are already normal, to some degree, in 
most affiliates as well as the Federation. They focus on defining how NOBs 
and officials can maintain worker control over strategic decisions while 
leaving some scope for participatory management within the organisation. 
This approach aims both to improve officials’ morale and to reduce the 
administrative burden on the Secretariat.
Proposal
We here present a rough model of union management for discussion at the 
Central committee.
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1. The constitutional structures set basic guidelines and give mandates on a 
regular basis.
2. Within these mandates, the NOBs set key priorities and monitor progress 
in achieving them. The prioritisation process takes place in three ways:
> Through regular strategic planning, which defines priorities based on 
Constitutional structures and resolutions. This process cannot simply list 
all mandated tasks, but must attempt to establish practical timetables and 
targets.
> Through the allocation of resources, especially the budget and the 
creation of posts. Budget systems and information must ensure that NOBs 
have a strategic oversight, letting them set overall allocations for priorities 
without getting bogged down in details.
> Through consistent monitoring and feedback of progress in achieving 
priorities, which should permit variations where necessary. That means 
that appropriate reporting and briefing systems must be established. 
Moreover, monitoring requires appropriate milestones to measure 
success. It should not mean that NOBs must track every step in every 
process, but rather that they can easily check on key achievements.
3. Heads of units must play an active and responsible role in terms of:
> Preparing proposals on priorities for approval by the Secretariat.
> Personnel management, including hiring and assessment in their units, 
again subject to Secretariat approval. They must ensure an open 
management style where all members of the unit can discuss key 
decisions, take responsibility in their areas, and raise criticisms or 
questions.
> Developing budget proposals within overall allocations set by the 
Secretariat.
> Reporting on priorities and briefing NOBs in depth on a regular basis.
4. The proposed system only works if management training is offered to the 
Secretariat and heads of unit. This training must strengthen competencies 
in prioritisation, including budgeting, and human-resource management. 
Since there are a host of union-specific issues involved, we propose that 
Ditsela develop a dedicated high-level course.
5. This structure of management requires that administrative meetings be 
carefully designed and managed. On the one hand, they must take place 
regularly, both for the organisation as a whole and within units. On the 
other, they cannot be allowed to degenerate into interminable events 
where issues are discussed at length irrespective of their importance. The 
Secretariat and heads of units must play a key role in ensuring that 
meetings support a free flow of information without getting sidetracked by 
trivia.
6.2 Staff Development
A survey of union staff conducted for the September Commission revealed a
high level of turnover and dissatisfaction. Yet more than any other
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organisation, a trade union is build on the activity, commitment and morale of 
its members and staff. Without them it is impossible to build solidarity or unity. 
A factory can continue to produce even if its staff and workers are unhappy, 
as long as the machinery keeps running -  in fact most factories in South 
Africa are like this! But in unions the staff are the machinery, and if they are 
not happy or effective the machinery will break down.
Factors leading to low staff morale include:
• Weak personnel management systems. In many unions, personnel 
assessment mechanisms, which would give officials consistent feedback 
on their work, are almost non-existent. This makes officials feel insecure, 
and can lead to conflict as problems are only dealt with when they become 
serious. Some office bearers do not know how to express criticism in 
supportive and constructive ways, so that officials end up feeling 
humiliated and angry. On the other hand, staff members rarely get 
appreciation for jobs well done.
• Hierarchical and closed decision-making processes that make staff feel 
disempowered and marginalised. In particular, if the Secretariat must 
make decisions that are neither strategic or political, it can become 
overloaded, leading to long delays. This can be very demoralising, since it 
prevents officials from making progress in their work.
• Unclear career paths, where grading systems do not provide for promotion 
when workers gain competencies through training or experience. For 
instance, most positions at COSATU have a single grade for each 
position, even though the competency of incumbents varies greatly. Staff 
members may find that after they have mastered the job thoroughly, they 
have no clear route to advance into new areas.
• Inconsistent skills development programmes. We need to ensure that 
union skills plans are developed through an open and consultative 
process, so that they provide a proper balance between staff members’ 
career aspirations and short-term union needs.
Unions need a committed cadre who understand the political importance of 
the union and the struggle at large. However, this is not an excuse for the 
super-exploitation of activists, denying them basic labour rights. Unions must 
become model employers by ensuring democratic management, staff 
development, and proper empowerment for staff, rather than a rigid 
disciplinarian approach.
In moving forward, it is important to accept that staff development is integral 
to organisational development. It should support strategic, critical thinkers at 
all levels. In this context, courses are not the primary solution. To build a 
committed staff cadre requires a process of on-going support and 
development so that they can use what they learn. A system of mentoring 
through heads of units and other comrades is critical.
Staff development requires appropriate staff systems. General frameworks 
should be developed by a dedicated person, ideally located in the Education 
Department. This comrade would establish systems to ensure consistent 
implementation of:
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• Appropriate staffing norms, to ensure an equitable and manageable 
burden of work at all levels.
• Assessment and feedback on individuals’ work in a developmental and 
constructive way.
• Employment equity.
• Policies on recruitment and induction.
• Identification of training needs in the context of a skills plan.
• Mentoring and support for junior staff.
• Career pathing in the context of an appropriate grading and assessment 
system.
• Staff policies that ensure clear conditions of employment, procedures for 
dealing with grievances and a disciplinary code.
A new problem is that formal compliance with the Skills Development Act 
risks establishing a “technicist” approach. We need to ensure that 
organisational development sets the framework for skills development plans. 
Moreover, the training of staff must be linked to skills development for office 
bearers and shop stewards.
A holistic and integrated approach to skills development requires:
• An integrated staff development plan that focuses on organisational 
change and development towards the building of the movement
• Identification of individual and collective learning needs
• A holistic approach towards enrolling staff in training programmes that 
takes into account strategic selection, pre-course work, and support during 
both the course and the implementation process thereafter
• The identification of appropriate and union-friendly education providers
Deliberately employing more shop stewards as officials, and ensuring that 
they can continuously upgrade their skills, will keep the organisation close to 
the interests and experiences of members.
Proposal
COSA TU must convene a workshop on staff systems and skills development 
in unions, to assess strengths and weaknesses in greater depth and begin to 
develop model policies. If necessary, it must bring in capacity for this 
purpose.
6.3 Financial management
Financial management has become a growing challenge, both for rapidly 
growing and for shrinking unions. Four unions -  SACCAWU, NEFIAWU, 
CEPPWAWU and SAAPAWU -  seem to be perpetually on the edge of 
bankruptcy, although for very different reasons.
There are two layers of problems around financial management:
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• ensuring that resources are allocated according to priorities, through 
efficient budget systems;
• accounting processes that prevent misuse and theft of members’ money.
The NOBs are ultimately responsible for budgets. Often, however, the lack of 
effective procedures for budgeting means that this task is poorly done or that 
it is unnecessarily time consuming.
A typical budget cycle should involve:
1. The establishment of key priorities and expected income by NOBs, and on 
that foundation basic allocations for programmes or units.
2. The development of draft budgets by officials in each unit, within the basic 
allocation for the year where possible, and with clear arguments if more 
money is needed.
3. The rationalisation of the budget to align with available resources by a 
technical committee, indicating the implications of the proposals for the 
organisation’s priorities.
4. Finalisation of the budget by the NOBs and constitutional structures.
Unfortunately, it seems that many unions, as well as the Federation, do not 
have clearly defined procedures and timetables to manage the budget. That 
means that the process often starts late, leading to a mad rush to complete it 
in time. Furthermore, it may lead to unnecessary conflict, as staff members 
and leaders only find out late in the year that the organisation simply cannot 
afford some important projects.
A second problem lies around accounting systems. Here we have very little 
information on affiliates’ practices. Three problems may arise:
• Accounting systems may not provide information needed by the NOBs to 
oversee union activities. Often, the information provided is too detailed, 
without indicating major programmes and important trends, making it 
unnecessarily hard to understand.
• Payment systems may be lax, slow, not aligned with organisational
priorities and ultimately open to theft. !
• The collection of dues may be weak, leading to persistent underfunding.
Proposal
The next phase of the organisational review process must include a 
component on financial management. COSATU will bring in an expert in 
union finances to work closely with the Federation and, if they request, with 
affiliates, to
• Develop budget procedures and systems, and
• Improve accounting and control systems._________________
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Chapter 7. An organisational development programme for 
COSATU
The work of the Organisational Review Commission demonstrated the need
for a much more systematic and thorough project to assist the Federation and
affiliates to define problems in greater detail and come up with solutions.
Problem areas include:
> Demarcation into super unions, and within super unions
> A practical programme for recruitment in each sector and region
> Evaluating and improving representation of workers in the workplace
> Women empowerment
> Defining the role of COSATU regions and locals
> Financial and personnel management systems and competencies.
7.1 Outputs of the programme
The programme will involve COSATU, its affiliates, and NALEDI. By
December 2002, it will develop:
1. For each affiliate, an assessment of organisational strengths and 
weaknesses, and proposals on the way forward, plus a detailed 
recruitment plan
2. For COSATU, an assessment of organisational strengths and 
weaknesses in the head office, regions and locals, and proposals on the 
way forward
3. An assessment of the work of COSATU constitutional structures, and 
proposals for remedying any problems.
4. A data base of shopstewards
5. A survey of worker attitudes toward, expectations of and knowledge about 
unions
6. Models for a budget cycle and financial management systems for 
COSATU and affiliates
7. A detailed proposal on demarcation, including how to achieve sectoral 
unions and the demarcation and structure of super unions.
7.2 Roles and responsibilities
COSATU will be responsible for:
1. Ensuring regular reports to Constitutional structures.
2. Convening regular meetings with affiliates to exchange experiences and 
develop technical guidelines.
3. Obtaining seed funding for the project, including resources for each 
affiliate.
4. Employing a co-ordinator for the project.
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5. Strategic guidance, quality control and management of cross-cutting 
projects (the survey, data base of shop stewards, and management 
models where appropriate).
6. The assessment of COSATU structures.
Affiliates will be responsible for:
1. Oversight of the entire project through the CEC and other Constitutional 
structures.
2. Establishing mandating and report-back structures for the project, and 
identifying a dedicated official to oversee it.
3. Support for the cross-cutting projects.
4. Assessment of its organisational needs and development of proposals to 
address them.
NALEDI will be responsible for:
1. Establishing a resource centre and support staff for affiliate and COSATU 
processes.
2. Duality control and mentoring, where affiliates or COSATU request it.
3. Assistance with fundraising.
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7.4 Budget estimates
1. Affiliates: R200 000 each
2. COSATU Co-ordinator -  R120 000 a year
3. Travel to regions/locals: R30 000
4. Development of database: R500 000
5. Survey: R500 000
6. NALEDI expertise: R200 000
7. Meetings: R500 000
TOTAL ROUGH ESTIMATE: R2,23 million.
Page 69 of 72
DRAFT 5






















COSATU First Vice President 
COSATU Second Vice President 
COSATU Treasurer 
COSATU General Secretary 
COSATU Deputy General Secretary 
SAMWU President 
SACTWU President 
SACTWU General Secretary 
SATAWU General Secretary 
NUMSA General Secretary 
NUM General Secretary









Page 70 of 72
DRAFT 5
How have unions responded to restructuring?
NALEDI and SW OP have categorised union responses to workp lace restructuring.
1. Compliance
In m any cases union responses to the restructuring o f work has invo lved de facto 
com pliance. This is c learest in the cases where there  is a re in troduction o f apartheid  
flexib ility. For exam ple  in the case o f the leather industry n P ieterm aritzburg the 
union, NULAW, com plied w ith  m anagem ent s tra teg ies and changing work practices. 
W orkers fe lt let dow n by the ir union, as they w ere  not able to e ffective ly ne ither 
negotiate on beha lf o f the ir m em bers nor com e up w ith  alternatives.
In the retail, metal and m in ing sectors, all characterised by large scale casualisation, 
outsourcing and subcontracting , the unions have failed to launch any system atic  
contestation of this, and have appeared to be content w ith concentrating  on the ir 
representation o f core w orkers. An exception w as at H ighveld Steel.
The sam e may be said in re la tion to the in tensification o f work and the in troduction  of 
new technology at Te lkom . Shop stew ards have a ttem pted to contest this, but w ith 
very little support from  the ir union.
2. Resisting/negotiating the effect of restructuring
M ost unions are resisting  or a ttem pting to negotiate  the  effects o f restructuring. At 
Te lkom  the union used a va rie ty  o f tactics in an a ttem pt to prevent re trenchm ent: 
industria l action, lobbying governm ent, pursuing the procedures o f the National 
Fram ework Agreem ent. A t Spoornet, SATAW U has dem anded a th ree-year 
m oratorium  on re trenchm ent w h ile  restructuring and turnaround are im plem ented. A t 
the sam e time, the union has negotiated an innovative  deve lopm enta l Social P lan in 
term s o f which a D eve lopm ent Agency is to be estab lished, funded by a R50 m illion 
loan from  the com pany, w h ich w ill provide the m ateria l and tra in ing resources to 
develop incom e-generating  stra teg ies fo r any w orkers  who are retrenched.
3. Contestation
This refers to the c lass ic  trade union strategy o f using organisational s trength  and 
inform al/form al industria l action com bined w ith negotia tion  to m odify o r reverse 
m anagem ent in itia tives. This em erges clearly in the Telkom  call centre  w here  shop 
stew ards organised to resist (in one case through a w ildca t strike) and renegotiate  
targets, as well as negotia te  agreem ents concern ing health and safe ty in o rder to 
deal w ith  stress. These in itia tives in d ifferent centres w ere w eakened by the lack o f 
union support and co-ord ination.
A t H ighveld Steel shop stew ards and works contested  both casua lisa tion  and 
in tensification o f work. They w ere able to negotiate  a process fo r converting  casual 
w orkers  into perm anent w orkers  over time, and w ere  able to insist tha t the  rights o f 
em ployees o f subcontracto rs could be protected through shop stew ards negotiating 
w ith  H ighveld Steel itself. W orkers resisted the in tensifica tion  o f w ork w ith  w ildca t 
stoppages, providing shop stew ards w ith the opportun ity  to negotiate the 
em ploym ent o f new  w orke rs  as well as new job  descrip tion  and upgrading.
4. Concession bargaining
The case study o f K e lv ina to r in the white goods sec to r could be classified as an 
exam ple o f concession bargain ing defensive negotiation . The union, NUM SA, 
agreed to the com pany em ploying  all new em ployees on the bargain ing council 
m in im um  wage instead o f the w age rate agreed to in the recognition agreem ent. The 
union, NUMSA, a lso agreed to support an increase in output. In spite o f these
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concessions the com pany w as neverthe less liqu idated. Indeed it could be argued 
that the vo lum e driven  stra tegy w as inappropria te  and led, w ithout access to export 
markets, a flood ing  o f the local market.
5. Restructuring of State Assets
At Telkom  the un ions chose not to  resist the in itia l sa le  o f a 30%  equity stake. The 
Com m unication  W orkers Union has opposed the p lanned IPO, but it is not sure  w hat 
s tra tegy the union is adopting.
A t Spoornet SATAW U a lso opposes the proposed concession ing o f the m ost 
profitable opera tions. Through a critica l ana lys is  o f the  consu ltan t’s proposals, and 
draw ing also on the in ternationa l experience  availab le  through the 1TF, the union in 
partnersh ip  w ith  NALED I has deve loped a robust critique o f privatisation. This 
appears to have opened the door to  serious negotia tion  w ith  governm ent over the 
Spoornet restructuring , in the form  o f a jo in t task team . T im e w ill tell w he ther the 
space is genu ine ly open o r not.
A third approach has been adopted by SAM W U in re lation to the restructuring o f 
m unicipal governm ent in Johannesburg. N egotia tions w ere linked closely to a 
cam paign o f resistance. So fa r the  cam paign appears to  have had little im pact on the 
restructuring.
6. Strategic engagem ent
“S trateg ic engagem en t” the S ep tem ber C om m ission  on the fu ture  o f trade un ions 
argued, “ is a s tra tegy fo r engaging w ith  restructuring  on the basis o f a union agenda 
and union independence as a w ay  o f transfo rm ing  and dem ocratis ing  the w orkp lace. 
The union ’s aim  is to increase  w o rke rs ’ contro l o f production, gain access to tra in ing  
and skills, and im prove  w ages and w ork ing cond itions”
C learly s tra teg ic engagem ent requires a union in itia tive, w hich is then negotiated 
w ith m anagem ent. Union m ay take  such an in itia tive  in response to  a m anagem ent 
initiative, o r in the  absence  o f m anagem ent in itia tive.
Strategic engagement was pioneered by NUMSA or in the early 1990s. The 
NUMSA strategy focused on introducing a new system of skills formation, 
grading, training career pathing and pay in the metal industry. The NUMSA 
strategy had two flaws: it focused on highly technical and complex proposals 
on grading and training which redistributed power within the union, 
disempowering many officials and shop stewards. Further more the 
preoccupation with sector level bargaining led to insufficient attention to the 
enterprise level and often led to deadlock in the bargaining councils. After 
eight years the strategy had very little impact on the workplace or on workers’ 
lives.
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